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This thesis examines the key elements of the EU policy on criminal procedural safeguards as 
set out by the Roadmap on Criminal Procedural Rights. This is done from both a substantial 
and an instrumental perspective.  
The thesis first outlines the developments prior to the Roadmap and identifies why agreement 
was never reached on an EU wide instrument. Subsequently the needs for EU involvement in 
this field are presented by pointing to the shortcomings in the various national legal systems 
as well as in the overarching ‘Strasbourg’ system.  
The first and most important part of the thesis thoroughly analyses the content of the 
instruments contained in the Roadmap and makes a textual comparison with the ECHR in 
order to get an understanding of how the rights presented by the Roadmap can add to existing 
levels of safeguards. 
The second part of the thesis examines what the value of the EU policy on procedural 
safeguards is for the successful application of ‘mutual recognition’ in criminal cooperation. 
The research outcomes are that the instruments as set out by the Roadmap have great 
potential under the current legal framework as introduced by the Lisbon Treaty and that the 
application of ‘mutual recognition’ can be enhanced by a strong set of EU wide safeguards. 
Condition for both these premises is that the ongoing implementation of the first two 
instruments and negotiations for the third instrument have to be taken seriously by the 
Member States and only a high level of safeguards will lead to defence rights at EU level that 
are not only more visible but also practical and effective. The outcome of the first two 
measures adopted in accordance with the Roadmap provides us with the hope that this high 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
Ever since the introduction of the ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (AFSJ),1 initially 
governed by intergovernmental judicial cooperation and currently by mutual recognition, 
there have been concerns for the standard of procedural rights in criminal proceedings. 
However, setting an EU-wide minimum standard for procedural rights has proven a rather 
complicated matter. A first attempt to adopt a framework decision on procedural rights was 
made by the European Commission in 2004, but ultimately (in 2007) failed to reach the 
required consensus.2 Just before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the issue was taken 
up again by the Swedish Presidency and this time with more success; agreement was reached 
on a ‘Roadmap for the strengthening of procedural rights of suspected and accused persons in 
criminal proceedings’.3 This Roadmap provides for a step-by-step approach and meanwhile 
the first two goals, to adopt a directive on the right to interpretation and translation and on the 
right to information, have been achieved. A first response to this development should be 
optimistic after the difficulties the adoption of such an instrument has known, but at the same 
time this current EU programme on procedural rights raises several issues regarding its value 
and objectives. The overall aim of this dissertation is to critically scrutinize the substance of 
the Roadmap, in doing so a two-step approach towards the Roadmap will be taken; first and 
foremost from a substantive viewpoint and then from a governance/instrumental one.    
The first part of the dissertation will form the core of this thesis and takes a substantive4 
approach. It will assess the value and content of the Roadmap (the measures adopted 
accordingly) from a legal perspective. Even though it is to be warmly welcomed that 
procedural rights are an actual EU priority again, it is at the same time still uncertain how the 
legislative process will develop and whether the proposed instruments in reality will add value 
to the existing framework of procedural safeguards already in place. This existing framework 
consists mainly of the relevant provisions of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), and therefore a comparative analysis 
with the new EU provisions will be essential. In order to get an accurate view of what these 
proposed rights actually add to current defence rights standards, it is important to get the aims 
                                                          
1 For more on the AFSJ see chapter 1.2 below. 
2 A closer look at the background and reasons for this failure will be taken in chapter 3.1 below. 
3 For a more exact analysis of the Roadmap see chapter 3.2 and 5 below. 
4 Although the word ‘substantial’ might sound contradictory as it concerns procedural rights here, the aim is to 
look at the actual content of the Roadmap and therefore the substance of the various instruments. 
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underlying these ‘new’ EU criminal procedural safeguards right. It is therefore necessary to 
keep in mind that the Roadmap does not necessarily aim at setting new standards, but to make 
current standards more efficient and transparent by providing the tools that can ensure 
effective protection of the rights. It could be said that the Lisbon Treaty has provided a new 
window of opportunity in this respect, as it enables directives to be adopted in this field 
together with its strong enforcement mechanism.5 The Lisbon Treaty has not only amended 
the legal instruments to be adopted, but also enhanced the role of the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) and finally formally recognised the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The 
improved jurisdiction of the ECJ will lead to case law on the rights of individuals in criminal 
proceedings and therefore has the potential to increase efficiency and transparency of 
procedural safeguards. The adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, together with the 
option for the EU to accede to the ECHR, also raises questions on how this affects the 
enforcement of procedural safeguards. All these elements will be examined in order to answer 
questions as what rights are being introduced, why are these rights being introduced and how 
can they be enforced. 
Next to a one-on-one comparison with the ECHR and a review of the relevant EU 
developments, the need for EU involvement in procedural rights will be underlined by 
pointing to the flaws in the current system and the bias in EU criminal justice matters towards 
prosecution facilitating measures and law enforcement. However, EU involvement in criminal 
procedural safeguards as such already implies that there is a need for action; if there was a 
sufficient basis for procedural rights protection why would the EU want to get involved? 
Even though we are still waiting for the first measure to enter into force, this analysis will be 
fruitful in the quest for an overall evaluation of the Roadmap and the measures adopted 
accordingly. 
After the substantial analysis the dissertation will look at the Roadmap from a more 
instrumental point of view, this merely to show there is another way of looking at the 
Roadmap and to present a complete and coherent picture. The current treaty basis for the 
directives adopted (or to be adopted) according to the Roadmap,6 takes an instrumental 
approach as it enables approximation ‘to the extent necessary to facilitate mutual recognition’. 
The principle of mutual recognition, being the ‘cornerstone’ principle in the AFSJ, in turn 
requires mutual trust and confidence between the Member States. Divergent standards for 
                                                          
5 For more on the effects of the Lisbon Treaty on European criminal justice matters see chapter 1.2 below. 
6 Article 82(2)(b) TFEU, infra note 49. 
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procedural rights throughout the EU have been in the way of a full and successful application 
of mutual recognition ever since its introduction. Therefore the question whether the 
Roadmap is a direct result of the mutual recognition agenda is a legitimate one; at the same 
time it is a sceptical one as one could take the alternative stance that even if this is the case 
this does not matter, as long as rights standards improve. However, the governance 
perspective is important to get a full overview of the objectives and value of the Roadmap, as 
in the current legal framework mutual recognition forms the legal basis for criminal 
cooperation.  
The question to answer in this light is; whether the Roadmap can overcome the difficulties the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition is facing. To answer this question the 
conclusion from the first part will form the core, as mutual trust can only increase if the 
Roadmap actually raises the standard of procedural guarantees. It has to be noted though that 
the instrumental perspective will have a secondary character and aims at supporting and 
completing the main perspective of this thesis, namely a substantial analysis of this new and 
ambitious piece of EU legislation. 
These two themes should lead to answering the overall research question: does the Roadmap 
improve procedural safeguards and can it, in its current form, lead towards a better application 
of mutual recognition in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice? It will be argued here that 
the added value of the Roadmap is to be found in the high standard of protection it aims at and 
more importantly; the high standard that has actually been achieved in the first two measures 
adopted accordingly. This together with the application of these rights in the context of EAW 
proceedings gives the Roadmap the potential to complement or even raise the Strasbourg 
standard. Also the nature of the legal instruments is important, as it opens up new 
enforcement mechanisms which have a greater potential than the ex post complaint procedure 
of the ECHR 
At this stage it will be difficult to evaluate the actual effect of the Roadmap on mutual 
recognition (and therefore also mutual trust), as the first directive has not entered into force 
yet, and the future ECJ case law together with possible monitoring reports will really provide 
ground for such conclusions. A theoretical approach however will enable a provisional 
evaluation of this kind; this in turn can contribute to pointing to the importance of minimum 
defence rights in the EU context. From a more optimistic viewpoint the question can then be 
asked: is the Roadmap actually leading towards a criminal justice system with rights at the 
very heart of it? 
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1.2. Introducing the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
EU Justice and Home Affairs law (JHA)7 has undergone an evolution, originating even before 
the Maastricht-era, from a dominantly intergovernmental approach to the application of the 
‘Community’ method, under which full supranational disciplines now extend to cover EU 
criminal law.8 A historical study of this institutional development shows that four different 
phases can be distinguished. In the following analysis these different eras of EU involvement 
in crime control will be distinguished and its main characteristics will be underlined.9 This 
will provide us with an overview essential to understand how these developments have 
culminated into an EU policy on criminal procedural safeguards. 
Trevi and Schengen (pre-1993)  
Until the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty (1993)10 cooperation in criminal law stood 
completely outside the Treaties. However, Member States have cooperated with each other in 
criminal matters for over half a century. This cooperation initially took place under the 
auspices of the Council of Europe, and then in 1975 the Trevi Group11 took over the initiative. 
Trevi was founded by the European Council as a forum of officials from the national 
ministries of justice and home affairs. This intergovernmental network acted as a security 
forum initially focussed on countering terrorism, but its interest grew and later included a 
wide range of crime control matters The group included the so called ‘friends of Trevi’, of 
which, amongst others, the US and Canada were ‘members’.12 Trevi’s structure would 
eventually lay the ground for the organisational foundation of the Third Pillar, and its acquis 
were adopted becoming the Third Pillar acquis.13  
Another pre-Maastricht development related to police and judicial cooperation took place. A 
                                                          
7 JHA law covers a range of policy fields such as asylum/immigration law and police cooperation, here will be 
focussed on the topic of this dissertation; cooperation in criminal matters. 
8 However, qualifications such as a transitional period and differentiated integration have been made, on which 
more below. 
9 For further analysis see E. Baker and C. Harding, ‘From Past Imperfect to Future Perfect? A Longitudinal Study 
of the Third Pillar’, 34(1) European Law Review (2009), 25-54; S. Peers, ‘EU Justice and Home Affairs Law’, in P. 
Craig and G. De Búrca  (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford, 2011), 269-297; D. Kostakopoulou, ‘Freedom, 
Security and Justice under the New Constitution’, in C. Barnard (ed.), The Fundamentals of EU Law Revisited: 
Assessing the Impact of the Constitutional Debate (Oxford, 2007), 153-191; For an earlier critical analysis see V. 
Mitsilegas, J. Monar and W. Rees, The European Union and Internal Security. Guardian of the People? 
(Basingstoke, 2003). 
10 Treaty on European Union (Treaty of Maastricht), in force November 1993, (1992) OJ C191. 
11 Trevi stand for Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, Political Violence, however other derivations are 
sometimes given. 
12 For more on Trevi see M. Anderson, M. den Boer, P. Cullen, W. Gilmore, C. Raab and N. Walker (eds.), 
Policing the European Union (Oxford, 1995), 53-56. 
13 See E. Denza, The Intergovernmental Pillars of the European Union (Oxford, 2002), 74-76. 
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small number of Member States initiated the Schengen process,14 which aimed at the 
abolition of internal border controls, starting with an Agreement in 1985 and accordingly a 
Convention implementing the Agreement.15 This approach proved more effective than the 
intergovernmental approach through which approval of the more reluctant Member States was 
required (such as the UK and Ireland).16   
Maastricht (1993-1999) 
It was against this background that a new phase in police and judicial cooperation occurred.17 
This phase in evolution is described by Peers as formal intergovernmentalism.18 The 
Maastricht Treaty introduced a set of specific rules relating to JHA,19 however these rules 
established a purely intergovernmental process of decision-making by which the Council 
could adopt either Conventions or other acts. The introduction of the Third Pillar20 was a clear 
first step towards formalisation of cooperation, but at the same time it also showed a 
reluctance to confer any ‘real’ power to the Community. This ‘reluctant’ intergovernmental 
approach ensured that a significant degree of control remained with the Member States. This 
was expressed in the dominance of the Council and the very limited role the other EC 
institutions played. The Commission was stripped of most of its First Pillar competences, the 
Court of Justice was not given any mandatory jurisdiction21 and the European Parliament had 
no decision-making authority.22 The downside to this approach in which Member States 
retained maximum control was the limited effectiveness of EU action.23 Therefore 
cooperation within the Schengen framework showed more results during this period, as it 
involved a smaller number of Member States which had agreed on a more delineated area of 
                                                          
14 The five original signatories were Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West-Germany. 
15 (2000) OJ L239/1; See D. O’Keeffe, ‘The Schengen Convention: A Suitable Model for European Integration?’, 
11(1) Yearbook of European Law (1991), 185-219. 
16 The implementing Convention was ratified in 1993, only three years after signature. 
17 Together with the areas of visas/border control, asylum and immigration. For an analysis of these 
developments see Peers, supra note 9. 
18 Peers, ibid, 270. 
19 TEU, supra note 10, Title V, Articles K to K.9. 
20 The pillar structure introduced by Maastricht (which follows the metaphor of a Greek temple) set out a 
distinct institutional framework consisting of the Community treaties (First Pillar), Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (Second Pillar) and JHA law (Third Pillar).   
21 As a ‘compromise’ to this lack of competence Member States agreed on a differentiated approach by which 
they could opt to give the Court of Justice jurisdiction over references from either all national courts, from final 
courts only, or from no national courts at all; See S. Peers, ‘Who’s Judging the Watchmen? The Judicial System 
of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, 18(1) Yearbook of European Law (2000), 337-413. 
22 TEU, supra note 10, Title V, Articles K.3-K.6. 
23 As an illustration; of the eight policing and criminal law conventions agreed during this period, only six 




cooperation. The number of signatories increased24 and its implementation was assured by the 
Executive Committee. However its limits became clear as well as there was no institutional 
framework in place to implement the full scope of the Convention. 
Amsterdam (1999-2009) 
The next significant reform of JHA law came with the Amsterdam Treaty;25 these reforms 
were to be expected as the problems related to the previously described institutional 
framework were obvious. It was with Amsterdam that the term AFSJ was introduced, and was 
created to indicate the EU’s ‘legal space’ for cooperation in police and criminal matters.  
Peers described this next phase as ‘modified intergovernmentalism’, referring to the still 
intergovernmental nature of the approach, but with some ‘modest concessions to the 
community mode’.26 The core of these reforms was formed by the transfer of the issues of 
immigration, asylum law and civil law to the First Pillar.27 In addition some amendments 
were made to the remaining Third Pillar issues; criminal law and police cooperation. The 
Commission had gained competence as the right of initiative was now shared with Member 
States, and the European Parliament received consultation power over nearly every measure.28 
Rules regarding the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice were standardized, and the 
‘differentiated’ approach continued its existence as Member States could opt for full 
jurisdiction over references, no jurisdiction at all or jurisdiction over references from the 
highest courts only.29 The ‘standard’ rules applied not only to conventions but to nearly all 
(post-Amsterdam) Third Pillar Measures.30  
An important change was the revision of the legal instruments to be used in the Third Pillar.31 
The convention and common position were retained, but two new types of instruments were 
introduced; the framework decision and the decision. Especially the framework decision was 
                                                          
24 In the mid 1990’s 13 of the, by then, 15 Member States had acceded to Schengen, the two exceptions being 
the UK and Ireland. Two non-EU Member States had also joined (Iceland and Norway), by means of a bilateral 
agreement. 
25 Treaty of Amsterdam, in force May 1999, (1997) OJ C340. 
26 Peers, supra note 9, 272. 
27 Even though these areas were part of the Community legal order now, a transitional period of five years 
applied to the application of traditional Community rules.  
28 Articles 34 and 37 former TEU. 
29 By the end of the Amsterdam-era 19 Member States had given the Court jurisdiction (all except the UK, 
Ireland and Denmark of the first 15 Member States and Poland, Estonia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Malta of the 
‘later’ Member States). 
30  The Court also gained jurisdiction over annulment actions and standard rules applied as regards jurisdiction 
over dispute settlement between Member States, or Member States and the Commission.  
31 Article 34 former TEU. 
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significant as it resembled the directive; it binds Member States as to the result achieved, but 
reserves the choice of form and method to the national level. However a crucial difference 
with the directive is that it cannot have direct effect, although the Court of Justice ruled in a 
later phase that even though a framework decision does not have direct effect, it may very 
well have indirect effect.32 Decisions were to be used for purposes other than approximation 
of national law, and direct effect was also ruled out. Especially the framework decision was 
an appealing and efficiency increasing instrument as national parliaments did not have to 
ratify these instruments for them to take effect. In line with these new instruments the 
adoption of conventions steadily declined, with the last convention adopted in 2003.33  
The last significant amendment brought about by the Amsterdam Treaty was the absorption of 
the Schengen infrastructure and acquis into the EU and EC legal frameworks.34 In order to 
accommodate the discrepancy between EU Member States and Schengen participants a 
special status was granted to the UK and Ireland35 to protect their right not to be bound by the 
Schengen acquis.36 But outside this exception the prior Schengen measures together with 
future measures were incorporated into the EC and EU legal order. 
Even though the Amsterdam Treaty instituted institutional and legal changes, and moved JHA 
law away from traditional intergovernmentalism, this progress was made against a high price. 
The previous ‘relatively simple’37 division between the Pillars was now replaced with a 
system of overlap and ambiguity, which threatened the consistency of the EU’s legal order.38 
Finally, another important development took place just after the entry into force of the 
Amsterdam Treaty. The Council started adopting multi-year programmes setting out the 
                                                          
32 ECJ 16 June 2005, Case C-105/03, Criminal Proceedings against Maria Pupino (2005), ECR I-5285; See M. 
Fletcher, ‘Extending ‘’Indirect Effect’’ to the Third Pillar: The Significance of Pupino’, 30(6) European Law 
Review (2005), 862-877; S. Peers, ‘Salvation Outside the Church: Judicial Protection in the Third Pillar after the 
Pupino and Segi Judgements’, 44(4) Common Market Law Review (2007), 883-929. 
33 Even though the Amsterdam Treaty tried to simplify the ratification of conventions, by allowing them to 
enter into force if a majority of Member States had ratified them (only for these ratifying Member States), it 
still took between three and seven years for the Conventions and Protocols which were signed after the 
Amsterdam Treaty to enter into force. 
34 On this integration process see N. Bracke, ‘The Amsterdam Treaty Framework with Special Reference to the 
Incorporation of the Schengen Acquis’, in P. Cullen and S. Jund (eds.), Criminal Justice Cooperation in the 
European Union after Tampere (Cologne, 2002), 23-34; D. Thym, ‘Schengen Law: A Challenge for Legal 
Accountability in the European Union’, 8(2) European Law Journal (2002), 218-245. 
35 Next to this special status on Schengen, the UK and Ireland (together with Denmark) were given a general 
competence to opt out of all the Title IV legislation together with an option to opt in at any stage. 
36 Protocols under B on the ‘Schengen Acquis’, Annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
37 Baker and Harding, supra note 9, 31. 
38 J. Monar, ‘Justice and Home Affairs in the Treaty of Amsterdam: Reform at the Price of Fragmentation’, 23(4) 
European Law Review (1998), 320-335, at 334. 
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political direction for the development of JHA law and policy. The first of these programmes 
was the Tampere Programme,39 adopted at the Tampere Council meeting in 1999 on the 
creation of an AFSJ in the EU. The Programme was hailed as an ambitious and striving 
programme with the aim of taking forward the newly created AFSJ agenda, and put forward 
ten priority areas for action.40 It furthermore introduced the principle of mutual recognition as 
the new methodology for criminal law cooperation, and was to become the ‘cornerstone 
principle’ in EU criminal justice cooperation.41  
The Tampere Programme was succeeded by the Hague Programme42 in 2005.43 The Hague 
Programme turned out to be less ambitious than Tampere and focussed mainly on operational 
cooperation in criminal matters and on security issues more generally. 
The latest and current Stockholm Programme,44 adopted in 2009 and setting the agenda for 
the period 2010-2014, seems to have returned to a more balanced and cohesive approach. 
Putting into practice the new legal framework as created by the Lisbon Treaty the Programme 
focusses ‘on the interests and needs of citizens’ and articulates a commitment to centre its 
activities on ‘citizens’ and ‘other persons for whom the EU has a responsibility’;45 its title 
does therefore not surprise: ‘an open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens’. 
The Programme underlines what its six thematic priorities are: promoting citizenship and 
fundamental rights; a Europe of law and justice; a Europe that protects; access to Europe in a 
globalised world; a Europe of responsibility, solidarity and partnership in migration and 
asylum matters; and the role of Europe in a globalised world- the external dimension. A 
section on which ‘tools’ are important for the Programme’s successful implementation 
follows the list of priorities, however according to Fletcher, ‘some of the tools might be better 
described as objectives’, as mutual trust and increased coherence can hardly be described as 
‘tools’, but rather as targets.46 This citizen-centred approach has led to an active policy on 
                                                          
39 Tampere European Council (15-16 October 1999), Presidency Conclusions, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm (accessed on 16 August 2012). 
40 Areas such as terrorism, migration, organised crime, the guarantee of an effective European area of criminal 
justice and a commitment to uphold fundamental rights within the AFSJ were those relating to criminal law.  
41 For more on the principle of mutual recognition see chapter 6 below. 
42 (2005) OJ C53/01; see also the action plan implementing the Hague Programme, (2005) OJ C198/01. 
43 On the implementation of the Hague Programme see J. De Zwaan and F. Goudappel (eds.), Freedom, Security 
and Justice in the European Union: Implementation of the Hague Programme (The Hague, 2006). 
44 See (2010) OJ C115/1; for the action plan implementing the Programme see COM (2010) 171 final, 20 April 
2010 Brussels. 
45 Stockholm Programme, supra note 44, point 1.1. 
46 M. Fletcher, ‘EU Criminal Justice: Beyond Lisbon’, in C. Eckes and T. Konstadinides (eds.), Crime Within the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Cambridge, 2011), 10-42, at 14. 
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criminal procedural rights and takes the form of the Roadmap on procedural rights, which is 
currently being implemented. However it remains to be seen whether the political agenda set 
in the Stockholm Programme really leads to an improved ‘rights’ situation for citizens. In this 
thesis the position of suspected and accused persons post Lisbon and Stockholm will be 
reviewed. 
It should furthermore be noted that the Amsterdam Treaty was eventually amended by the 
Nice Treaty, which entered into force in February 2003. However its changes were most 
obvious as regards immigration and asylum law. Except for a more active role played by the 
Court, there was no amendment made affecting the powers of either the Parliament or the 
Commission regarding AFSJ matters. 
Lisbon (2009-present)47 
The Treaty of Lisbon formally abolishes the pillar structure of the EU as created by the 
Maastricht Treaty, and puts an end to the inconvenient dual Treaty coverage of AFSJ policy 
fields as created by the Amsterdam Treaty by grouping provisions concerning the AFSJ 
together.48 The Lisbon Treaty amends both the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community; the EC Treaty is renamed the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).49 Relevant for our purposes is the new Title V 
(TFEU): ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, and especially Chapter 4 on ‘Judicial 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters’.  
Arguably the biggest changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty concern the field of judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. Here follows a summary of the amendments brought about 
by Lisbon regarding decision-making and the institutional framework.  
                                                          
47 For a full account of the Lisbon Treaty see, for instance, P. Craig, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon, Process, Architecture 
and Substance’, 33(2) European Law Review (2008), 137-166; P. Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics and 
Treaty Reform (Oxford, 2010); for more specifically on criminal matters see Fletcher, ibid; S. Peers, ‘EU Criminal 
Law and the Treaty of Lisbon’, 33(4) European Law Review (2008), 507-529; C. Ladenburger, ‘Police and 
Criminal Law in the Treaty of Lisbon- A New Dimension for the Community Method’, 4 European Constitutional 
Law Review (2008), 20-40; A. Hinarejos, ‘The Lisbon Treaty Versus Standing Still: A View From the Third Pillar’, 5 
European Constitutional Law Review (2009), 99-116; J. Piris, The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis 
(Cambridge, 2010), 167-203; and more broadly the impact on JHA matters see S. Carrera and F. Geyer, ‘The 
Reform Treaty and Justice and Home Affairs: Implications for the Common Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice’, Policy Brief No. 141, Centre for European Policy Studies (2007). 
48 E. Sanfrutos Cano, ‘The End of the Pillars? A Single EU Legal Order after Lisbon’, in C. Murphy and P. Green 
(eds.), Law and Outsiders: Norms, Processes and ‘Othering’ in the Twenty-first Century (Oxford, 2011), 67-87. 
49 The Treaty was signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, 2007/C306/01. For the consolidated version of the 
treaties as amended by the Lisbon Treaty see (2010) OJ C83/1. 
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Next to the abolition of the pillar structure, the (intergovernmental) requirement for unanimity 
is also replaced by a more modern standard.50 Instead Lisbon introduced, in most policy 
areas,51 the so called ‘ordinary legislative procedure’. This procedure, also known as the ‘co-
decision procedure’ provides for the shared decision-making power between the European 
Parliament and the Council for a regulation, directive or decision on a proposal from the 
Commission (or as will be seen below a group of Member States) and requires a qualified 
majority in the Council.52 The application of the ‘co-decision procedure’ does not only mean 
that the EU legislates in criminal justice matters by the same processes as it does for 
everything else, it also entails the use of the same instruments. These instruments are now 
regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions.   
Furthermore the Lisbon Treaty enhanced the role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
Whereas the Court’s jurisdiction was significantly limited pre-Lisbon, the Court now has full 
jurisdiction in all JHA areas. This full ‘judicial control’ also benefits from  the infringement 
proceedings the Commission can initiate against recalcitrant Member States which fail to 
implement EU criminal law measures,53 and entails jurisdiction for the Commission over 
actions against EU institutions for compensation for damages.54  
Lastly but not less important, the Lisbon Treaty also makes significant amendments to the EU 
involvement in fundamental rights. Article 6 TEU incorporates the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights into the EU legal framework and provides the legal basis for EU accession to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR). The Lisbon Treaty, together with the Stockholm Programme, aims at improving the 
rights situation in the EU by introducing new ways of enforcing them. By making the EU 
Charter on Fundamental Rights (finally) enforceable, EU institutions, Union bodies, offices 
and agencies together with Member States when implementing EU law are under an 
obligation to ensure that fundamental rights are respected in all areas of EU involvement.55 
Whether the EU will accede to the ECHR remains to be seen, however if this does happen it 
                                                          
50 S. Peers, ‘Finally ‘Fit for Purposes’? The Treaty of Lisbon and the End of the Third Pillar Legal Order’, 27(1) 
Yearbook of European Law (2008), 47-64. 
51 The only competence areas where unanimity is still required involve the establishment of a European Public 
Prosecutor (Article 86(1) TFEU), the establishment of new crimes for which there should be harmonization 
(Article 83(1) TFEU), and operational cooperation (Articles 86(3) and 89 TFEU). 
52 Articles 289 and 294 TFEU. 
53 Articles 258-260 TFEU. 
54 Article 268 TFEU. 
55 Provisions of the Charter which are relevant for our purposes here are Articles 47 (on the right to an effective 
remedy and to a fair trial) and 48 (on the presumption of innocence and right of defence), for more on these 
provisions see chapter 3.3 below. 
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will mean that the EU is directly responsible for human rights violations,56 and will lead to an 
AFSJ in which the safeguards of the ECHR are directly enforceable as complaints may be 
lodged against the EU itself. 
These amendments taken together lead to the application of the full Community method in 
this area and are therefore a positive step towards an AFSJ that is being taken seriously.57  
However, if it was not for the qualifications made to these ‘Community amendments’. The 
first limitation is the possibility for a group of Member States to counter a proposal made by 
the Commission.58 This can seriously undermine proposals made by the Commission.59 Next, 
the jurisdiction of the ECJ is also limited by a five-year transitional period regarding Third 
Pillar measures adopted before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.60 This means that 
until 14 December 2014 the pre-Lisbon rules that limited the Court’s jurisdiction remain in 
force. It is until a pre-existing instrument is amended or replaced within that five-year period 
that the Court’s full jurisdiction will apply. Furthermore, a so called ‘emergency-break’61 
procedure allows any Member State to halt a proposed measure on the grounds that the 
measure ‘would affect fundamental aspects of its criminal justice system’, and refer the 
proposal to the European Council. The European Council has four months to refer the draft 
back to the Council of Ministers. This ‘brake’ can be pulled during negotiations for both 
substantive62 and procedural63 approximating measures. Where there is still no agreement on 
the referral back, the remaining Member States (a minimum of nine) can proceed with the 
proposal under enhanced cooperation.64 This mechanism is not available for measures 
implementing the principle of mutual recognition. This procedure is a reminiscent of concerns 
for sovereignty and the fear for loss of national legal identities.  
                                                          
56 Note that the Stockholm Programme has prioritised accession, calling on the Commission to submit a 
proposal on this accession as a matter of urgency, supra note 44, point 2.1. 
57 This also stems from the priority given to the AFSJ objective on the list of EU objectives in Article 3(2) TEU 
and its recognition as an area of shared competence between Member States and the EU in Article 4(2)(j) TFEU. 
58 Article 76 TFEU. 
59 As will be seen later, this provision was applied several times in the early phase of the Lisbon Treaty, see for 
instance the Member States’ initiatives for Directives on the Rights to Interpretation and Translation in Criminal 
Proceedings (2010) OJ C69/01; on a European Protection Order (2010) OJ C69/02; and for a European 
Investigation Order (2010) OJ C165/02. 
60 Article 10 of the Transitional Protocol (No. 36) attached to the TFEU. 
61 For a more detailed description of this procedure see Peers, supra note 47, 516-520. 
62 Article 83(3) TFEU. 
63 Article 82(3) TFEU. 
64 Articles 20(2) TEU and 329(1) TFEU. 
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A further constraint on the application of the Community method is the continuation of the 
opt-outs provided for the ‘JHA sceptical’ Member States.65 The UK, Ireland and Denmark 
have secured significant opt-outs from criminal law and policing measures. No new or 
amending provision in criminal justice matters will apply to the UK or Ireland, unless they 
have decided otherwise, they can thus decide on each separate measure whether to opt-in or 
not.66 If their opt-out from an amending measure would result in the measure becoming 
inoperable for other Member States, the existing measure would no longer be binding on 
them. Even though these opt-outs lead to legal fragmentation and an immensely complicated 
system, the alternative would have been worse as development would have taken place 
outside the EU legal framework without participation of all Member States. Regarding the 
focus here; defence rights, the situation can be rather unsatisfactory as the UK and Ireland 
could opt out of measures concerning suspects’ rights, but into the mutual recognition 
measures which they aim to legitimize or counterbalance.  
Significant improvements have also been made regarding the methodologies and competences 
in the field. The pre-Lisbon regime was rather vague and unclear in establishing EU 
competence over matters of criminal justice in Articles 29 and 31(1)(e) former TEU. These 
two provisions have led to a number of competence debates67 and in some cases even to the 
adoption of legislation on rather ambiguous grounds. The Lisbon Treaty aims at clarifying 
this situation and leaving no question marks regarding the EU competence in the field; Article 
4(2)(j) TFEU lists AFSJ as one of the areas in which the EU shares competence with the 
Member States. Even though it can be noted that this was de facto already the case, according 
to Fletcher ‘its inclusion might be said to entail a conceptual promotion in that it is explicitly 
recognised as being on par with such areas of established EC competence as ‘the internal 
market’, ‘environment’ and ‘transport’.68  
The more specific legal competences of the EU in AFSJ matters are centred on the two main, 
and sometimes competing, methodologies of mutual recognition and 
approximation/harmonization of laws. The principle of mutual recognition has been described 
as the automatic recognition and enforcement by courts of two different jurisdictions of each 
other’s rulings, thus without any examination of the factual basis upon which they were 
                                                          
65 See S. Peers, ‘In a World of Their Own? Justice and Home Affairs Opt-Outs and the Treaty of Lisbon’, 10 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (2008-09), 383-412; See also Fletcher, supra note 46, 26-28. 
66 As regards the Roadmap both Ireland and the UK have opted in to Measures A and B, but not to Measure C 
yet. 
67 For example the failed Framework Decision on Procedural Rights, as will be discussed in chapter 3.1 below. 
68 Fletcher, supra note 46, 33. 
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made.69 The principle was first introduced in the EU criminal justice context by the European 
Council meeting in Tampere (1999), and since then a whole series of legislation has been 
adopted on this basis.70 The Lisbon Treaty has now71 formally adopted this principle by 
establishing that ‘the Union shall endeavour to ensure a high level of security (…) through the 
mutual recognition of judgements in criminal matters and, if necessary through the 
approximation of criminal laws’. The Lisbon Treaty thus presents mutual recognition next to 
approximation as linked methodologies; however in practice these models of development of 
EU criminal law have shown a deep tension.72 
More helpful is the new Treaty’s approach on the more specific EU criminal law 
competences, as a clear distinction is made between criminal procedure and substantive 
criminal law. Both the new provisions each confer two separate powers: Article 82 concerns 
mutual recognition rules (par. 1), and procedural approximation in order to facilitate mutual 
recognition (par. 2)73; and Article 83 confers the power to harmonise substantive criminal law 
in ten specified fields (par. 1), and secondly to adopt substantive criminal measures related to 
other Union policies.74 
Overall, it is clear that very significant changes have been made to the previous Treaty rules 
on EU criminal justice matters. Major amendments such as the shift to qualified majority 
voting and the co-decision procedure have brought improvement and clarification to the AFSJ 
legal framework. Despite the qualifications made to the full-community method, it can be said 






                                                          
69 A more precise account of mutual recognition will be given in chapter 6 below.  
70 The first and most prime example being the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant, (2002) OJ 
L190/1; hereafter EAW. 
71 Article 67(3) TFEU. 
72 For a more detailed look at the relation between these methodologies see chapter 6 below. 
73 The provision on which the measures contained in the Roadmap are based. 
74 For a more detailed analysis of these two articles see Peers, supra note 47, 508-515. 
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Chapter 2. The need for EU action on criminal procedural safeguards  
2.1. Introduction 
In this chapter the reasons for EU involvement in setting a common minimum standard for 
criminal procedural safeguards are examined. This will mainly be done by making use of the 
outcomes of several research projects that have been conducted on the state of procedural 
rights throughout the EU, together with an analysis of the shortcomings of the main source for 
the protection of human rights in criminal proceedings; the ECHR.  
It is evident from the fact that the EU has got itself involved in criminal procedural safeguards 
that there is a need for action; if there already was a sufficient basis for the protection of 
defence rights in place, why even bother?  
With the introduction of the concept of mutual recognition in the AFSJ, activity in the field of 
police and judicial cooperation has flourished, with numerous framework decisions, decisions 
and positions as a result.75 In this effort at increasing efficiency, defence rights have been 
side-lined and the emphasis was clearly on fighting crime. Defence safeguards have been 
omitted from the specific instruments themselves76 and the EU has also failed to provide 
protection through a separate framework. 
2.2. Research conducted on the state of procedural safeguards throughout the EU 
However the early efforts to adopt an EU-wide measure on safeguards never led to the 
conclusion of an instrument on defence rights,77 research that has been done since this failure 
has pointed out the need for EU action as it showed how poor the provision of procedural 
rights is across the EU.78 A study conducted on the existing level of defence rights in all EU 
Member States showed that certain fundamental procedural rights, such as the right to remain 
                                                          
75 For more on mutual recognition see chapter 6 below. 
76 One rare example of defence protection can be found in Article 11(2) Framework Decision on the EAW, supra 
note 70, which provides for legal representation and interpretation and has created a mechanism for hearings 
before a judicial authority in the executing state.  
77 As will be seen in chapter 3.1 below. 
78 See in particular T. Spronken, G. Vermeulen, D. de Vocht and L. van Puyenbroeck, EU Procedural Rights in 
Criminal Proceedings (Maklu, Antwerp, 2009), funded and published by the Commission, 8 September 2009, 
available at http://arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=16315 (accessed on 12 August 2012); this was a follow-up to a 
previous study T. Spronken and M. Attinger, Procedural Rights in Criminal Proceedings: Existing Level of 
Safeguards in the European Union, funded and published by the Commission, 12 December 2005, available at 
http://arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=3891 (accessed on 12 August 2012); see also G. Vernimmen- van Tiggelen 
and L. Surano, Analysis of the future of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters in the European Union 
(Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, 2008), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/doc_centre/criminal/recognition/docs/mutual_recognition_en.pdf (accessed on 15 
August 2012).  
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silent, are not provided for in the legislation of all Member States.79 Following on from this it 
was found that even if procedural safeguards are guaranteed by national law, their 
implementation quite often does not meet the Strasbourg standard. 
Another project conducted on the state of procedural safeguards in the EU stressed that 
effective criminal defence not only requires adequate legal assistance, but also a legislative 
and procedural context, together with the organisational structures that enable and facilitate 
effective defence, being a crucial element of the right to a fair trial.80 Thus a comprehensive 
approach by the EU is needed and five themes emerged that showed major deficiencies in the 
mechanisms and national judicial cultures that support effective criminal defence.81 As 
summarised by Spronken these five themes are: ‘first, legal assistance is in many countries 
problematic, especially with regard to access to legal assistance, the timeliness of the access 
and the quality of legal assistance.’82 ‘Secondly, legal aid … is often ineffective due to slow, 
unclear and complicated application methods. In addition, availability, quality and 
independence of criminal defence lawyers in legal aid cases proved to be inadequate, inter 
alia, due to low remuneration provided for legal aid work.’83 ‘Thirdly, interpretation and 
translation are not always guaranteed and, in particular, problems arise with regard to which 
documents are to be translated and how this is funded.’84 Fourthly, there is often a deficiency 
in the provision of adequate time and facilities, the needs and interests of the judicial 
authorities are paramount and do not take into account the needs of the suspect or accused.85 
Lastly, ‘the excessive use of pre-trial detention that in itself implies major concerns for the 
adherence to the presumption of innocence but which also impacts on the defence strategy …, 
being in custody limits the ability of suspects to prepare their defence.’86  
Not surprisingly these themes correspond to a large extent with the areas prioritised by the 
Roadmap. These projects show that deficiencies occur in practically all Member States and 
give a detailed account on which rights improvement is needed. The EU has made use of 
                                                          
79 See the project by Spronken et al., ibid. 
80 See ‘Effective Defence Rights in the EU and Access to Justice: Investigating and Promoting Best Practice’, a 
project which was conducted over a three year period closely analysing 9 jurisdictions, the results of which 
have been published in a book: E. Cape, Z. Namoradze, R. Smith and T. Spronken, Effective Criminal Defence in 
Europe (Antwerp, 2010). 
81 Ibid, 581-611. 
82 T. Spronken, ‘EU Policy to Guarantee Procedural Rights in Criminal Proceedings: an Analysis of the First Steps 
and a Plea for a Holistic Approach’, 1(3) European Criminal Law Review (2011), 213-233, at 228. 
83 Ibid, 228-229. 





these findings (some of the projects were funded by the Commission), and adopted its 
approach accordingly.   
Another ‘right’ on which extensive research has been conducted and is also prioritised in the 
Roadmap is the right to information, or more specifically the so called ‘letter of rights’.87 In 
the Commission Green Paper on procedural rights a letter of rights is considered as a short 
document to be given to suspects as early as possible, preferably at arrest, by which a suspect 
would be given information regarding his fundamental rights in writing in a language he 
understands. In a research project conducted by Spronken a broader definition is used to 
describe the letter of rights; ‘written information of the suspect’s procedural rights in a 
standardised form that is handed over to the suspect in the course of the criminal investigation 
or proceedings prior to an investigative act or hearing’.88 The study revealed that in 17 
Member States, suspects are informed of their rights by a standardised form. These ‘letters’ 
contained a variety of topics (as many as 12), however all contained information on legal 
assistance (not always on legal aid). Furthermore information on the right to silence, contact 
with trusted persons, translation and interpretation and consular assistance are dealt with in a 
considerable number of ‘letters’. Large differences occurred in how and in what kind of 
format the information is given. An aspect of significant importance is the language used in a 
letter of rights. Only a few Member States have the letter available in multiple languages,89 
‘something which is obviously detrimental for the effectiveness’ of such a letter.90 In many 
cases, the letters are full of formal and often legal language, in some cases even quoting 
lengthy legal provisions, which is difficult to understand for people who are not legally 
educated. 91 
In interviews with practitioners it turned out that the Member States who provided letters of 
rights often have a well-organised procedural framework in place to actually support the 
rights. However it also became clear that much of the effectiveness of a letter depends on the 
way it is brought into practice. The police play a key role in this, and they often consider the 
                                                          
87 T. Spronken, An EU-Wide Letter of Rights: Towards Best Practice (Antwerp, 2010). This study developed a 
normative framework, based on the ECtHR case law, to establish standards and a legal basis for information 
that should be given to a suspect in the initial phase of police investigations 
88 Ibid, 7. 
89 England and Wales, Germany, Sweden and Belgium provide the letter in more than 40 different languages. 
90 Spronken, supra note 82, 224. 
91 Examples of letters that provide information in a more understandable form can be found in Austria, 
Germany, Luxembourg and Spain. All letters can be found in Spronken, supra note 87. 
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letter to be a rather cumbersome formality that might interfere with the effectiveness of 
interrogation.92 
Here again, the EU has drafted the model letter contained in Measure B in accordance with 
the findings of this project. This piece of research showed how valuable EU action would be 
in this field, as standards diverge largely and ‘letters’ are often not drafted in a way that it 
effectively assists suspects or defendants in their defence.  
The above short summary of the findings of these extensive projects into EU-wide standards 
shows the need for the EU to fill the breach. One of the main arguments of the Member States 
opposing the Framework Decision Procedural Rights was that no EU action was needed as all 
Member States were parties to the ECHR and were therefore bound by a sufficiently high 
level of protection.  
In the following the ‘flaws’ in the Strasbourg enforcement-mechanism together with some 
other inefficiencies will be highlighted as evidence for the preposition that it is insufficient to 
rely on the ECHR alone. 
2.3. The shortcomings of the Strasbourg system 
In the past years the ECtHR has seen a steady increase in the number of applications, caused 
by the growing number of Member States as well as the frequent use of the individual 
complaint procedure. This has led to an enormous backlog which seriously undermines the 
effectiveness of the Court.93 It has made it difficult for the Court to deal in a proper and 
timely manner with all complaints, and it can take years before a final decision has been made 
in any individual case. 
A large number of violations in the current case law of the Court concerns ‘repetitive cases’, 
which are cases in which the Court decides on matters previously dealt with, but which 
                                                          
92 It also appeared from these interviews that the police often negatively impact the effectiveness of a letter, 
for example by dissuading a suspect to exercise his defence rights or not explaining them properly. 
93 As an illustration: on 31 December 2007 there were 79400 pending applications (before a judicial formation), 
on 31 December 2011 this has increased to 151600. For more statistical information on the ECtHR see 




remain troublesome as the Member States(s) involved have not yet taken the necessary steps 
to comply with the decision.94 
The occurrence of these repetitive cases shows that national systems are not always in 
accordance with the ECHR and also that judgements are not correctly executed by Member 
States.95 This problem is however almost inherent in the nature of the Strasbourg case law; as 
rulings are always on the specific facts and circumstances of a particular case it is difficult to 
draw general conclusions from a case. It is very exceptional for the Court to declare a part of 
national law as such incompatible with the Convention, and thus the effects of a finding in an 
individual case in the national legal system rely largely on the interpretation of the national 
authorities, who are entitled to a wide ‘margin of appreciation’ in this interpretation. Taking 
all these difficulties into consideration Spronken’s conclusion on this matter seems fair: 
‘the strengths of the Strasbourg complaint mechanism lies in doing justice to each 
individual case, but its weakness lies in the fact that it is hard to deduce general rules 
from its case law and that the Court has no powers to implement general implications 
of its judgements under national jurisdictions.’96 
From both the high number of applications the ECtHR receives and the regularity with which 
most Member States find themselves before the Court and the substantial amount of repetitive 
cases, one can easily conclude that the Strasbourg enforcement mechanism is not as effective 
as often thought. Especially because these statistics only tell part of the story; only some of 
those who believe their fundamental rights have been violated actually file an application in 
Strasbourg.97 Even though the Council of Europe is aware of the challenges the Court is 
facing and aims at dealing with the backlog by means of a ‘priority policy’, and by 
streamlining procedures for the handling of inadmissible and repetitive cases,98 it is doubtful 
                                                          
94 An example of which can be found in the cases against a small group of States (for example Italy and Spain) 
who continuously violate the right of a suspect to be tried within a reasonable time, as assured by Article 6(1) 
ECHR. 
95 It should be noted that it is for the Member States to act on complaints of victims of Convention violations 
and to press for reparation of the consequences of the violation, see Article 46(1) ECHR. 
96 Spronken, supra note 82, 215. 
97 Reasons for this include: some may not know the Court; the procedure is complicated; not all lawyers know 
how to make an application; and financial reasons such as no available legal aid. See C. Morgan, ‘Proposal for a 
Framework Decision on Certain Procedural Rights Applying in Proceedings in Criminal Matters throughout the 
European Union’, in M. Leaf (ed.), Cross-Border Crime: Defence Rights in a New Era of International Judicial 
Cooperation (London, 2006), 93-102, at 101. 
98 The Member States have pledged to deal with the challenges the Court is facing at the Brighton Conference 
of 20 April 2012. See the ‘Brighton Declaration’, especially point 19 and 20, available at 
http://www.coe.int/en/20120419-brighton-declaration/ (accessed on 16 August 2012).   
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Chapter 3. EU involvement in criminal procedural safeguards 
3.1. A first attempt for an EU instrument on procedural safeguards: the failed 
Framework Decision on Procedural Rights 
The proposal for a Council Framework Decision on certain procedural rights in criminal 
proceedings throughout the EU (FDPR)99 was the first EU attempt to adopt a measure on 
criminal procedural rights. Its objective was to assure a minimum standard of procedural 
safeguards throughout the EU. In this short evaluation of the attempt the two main reasons for 
its failure are presented; the slow and difficult negotiations and an alleged lack of EU 
competence to legislate in the field of criminal procedure. 
Negotiations and content of the proposal 100  
The Commission finally tabled its first proposal for a FDPR in 2004,101 after it circulated a 
Consultation Paper in February 2002 that outlined its first ‘ideas’ on common procedural 
safeguards and in which the Commission committed itself to approximation of individual 
procedural rights as ‘a necessary safeguard against measures of judicial cooperation that 
enhance the powers of police, prosecutors and judges’.102 A Green Paper on the outcome of 
these consultations followed and showed immediately that the Commission’s initial 
enthusiasm had to be tempered.103 
The process of negotiations can be described as cumbersome and slow, mainly due to the 
requirement of unanimity in the Council.104 This difficult process can be illustrated by the 
different forms the proposal took throughout the negotiations, every subsequent proposal 
reducing the content of the first text further.105 The initial text of the proposal put forward five 
fundamental guarantees, being: the right to legal advice; the right to interpretation and 
                                                          
99 For the final text see Council doc. 10287/07, 5 June 2007 Brussels. 
100 For a more extensive analysis of the negotiations and content of the Proposal see M. Jimeno-Bulnes, ‘The 
Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Certain Procedural Rights in Criminal Proceedings Throughout 
the European Union’, in E. Guild and F. Geyer (eds.), Security versus Justice? Police and Judicial Cooperation in 
the European Union (Aldershot, 2008), 171-202. 
101 See COM (2004) 328 final, 28 March 2004 Brussels; on this first proposal see C. Brants, ‘Procedural 
Safeguards in the European Union: Too Little, Too Late?’, in J. Vervaele (ed.), European Evidence Warrant 
(Antwerp, 2005), 103-119. 
102 The Consultation Paper was posted on the website of the Justice and Home Affairs Directorate-General 
(website no longer available), and a questionnaire was sent to the Member States. 
103 COM (2003) 75 final, 19 February 2003 Brussels. 
104 Under the Treaty Framework in place at the time unanimity was required by Article 34(2) TEU. 
105 ‘In the light of political realities’ this ‘watering down’ was already expected by Alegre at the adoption of the 
initial proposal, see S. Alegre, ‘EU Fair Trial Rights- Added Value or No Value?’, 154 New Law Journal (2004), 
758-761, at 759. 
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translation; specific attention for persons who cannot understand the proceedings; 
communication and consular assistance; and the so called ‘letter of rights’. Even though these 
rights seem modest and basic in scope, some Member States feared the implications of these 
rights in their criminal justice systems.  
Two opposing views on the need for approximation of procedural rights on EU level 
emerged; one defending the need for a binding set of minimum criminal procedural standards 
and another believing that the ECHR alone provides sufficient protection to ensure a high 
standard of criminal procedural rights, and therefore the proposed instrument would be 
superfluous;106 the latter view in spite of the (political) priority given to the adoption of such 
an instrument by the Hague Programme (2005).107 
Negotiations nearly stalled during the UK Presidency (second half of 2005), and fruitless 
attempts to reach agreement were made by the subsequent Austrian and Finnish Presidencies. 
This difficult political landscape forced the German Presidency to draft a significantly 
‘watered down’ version of the text, and a second text was proposed by the German Presidency 
which only included three rights and followed the ECHR more closely.108 The ‘German text’ 
also excluded from the scope of the FDPR proceedings against suspected terrorists, as this 
was one of the concerns raised by the group of six. But in spite of these concessions 
agreement on the text has proven to be impossible,109 even though subsequently another, even 
further ‘diminished’,110 text was proposed.111 According to the Council of Europe the latest 
proposal was in such a state that it no longer believed that the text was compatible with the 
right to a fair trial as set out in the ECHR.112 The group of six, led by the UK, did not seem to 
have a ‘sincere’ will to adopt the FDPR. Especially the British position was remarkable 
                                                          
106 The former being supported by a majority of Member States, the later supported by six states: Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Ireland, Slovakia and UK. These six states proposed a non-binding Resolution, see House of 
Lords European Union Committee, Breaking the Deadlock: What Future for EU Procedural Rights?, 2nd Report, 
session 2006-07, HL Paper 20; See also Council doc. 7349/07, 13 March 2007 Brussels. 
107 As envisaged in The Hague Programme, supra note 42, at par. 1 and 12; par. 3.3.1. (also 12) even sets the 
end of 2005 as the deadline for the adoption of the Framework Decision. 
108 Council doc. 16874/06, 22 December 2006 Brussels; later another similar but updated version of the text 
was issued by Germany. 
109 Even on the basis of ‘enhanced cooperation’ agreement was not possible, since there was not a qualified 
majority of Member States in favour of adopting the instrument. 
110 As observed by Jimeno-Bulnes, supra note 100, 179, the final proposal reduced the original text ‘enormously 
in both its formal and its material content’. 
111 This was the ‘final’ proposal, see supra note 99. 
112 See S. Peers, ‘Rights for Criminal Suspects and EU Law’, Statewatch Analysis (2007), available at 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/apr/Statewatch-analysis-crim-proced.pdf (accessed on 12 August 
2012); According to the Council of Europe ‘the present draft was no longer Strasbourg proof’, Note from the 
Council of Europe to the Presidency, Council doc. 8200/07, 2 April 2007 Brussels. 
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because it was initially in favour of the instrument. A coherent reason has not been given for 
this ‘sudden’ change in position,113 it is believed though that the White Paper articulating the 
Government’s intention of ‘Rebalancing the criminal justice system in favour of the law-
abiding majority’,114 played an important role as it was feared its impact would be minimised 
if it appeared alongside an instrument which gives ‘criminals’ more rights.115 
However this short summary of events only partly explains the failure of the instrument,116 it 
does underline the difficulties adopting measures in the field of criminal procedure brings 
about. Reaching agreement on common definitions such as ‘criminal proceedings’, ‘arrested’ 
and ‘charged’ is far from straightforward given the diversity in criminal justice systems 
throughout the EU. As sharply observed by Mitsilegas ‘it appears that … it has been easier for 
Member States to agree on a political declaration on the necessity of measures (in the Hague 
Programme) than reaching agreement on the substance of a number of complicated issues’.117 
Legal basis 
In reality the situation was even more complicated than described above, as Member States 
(the same group of six) and commentators pointed to an absence of legal grounds to adopt 
measures of this sort. Whereas the current legal regime enables the establishment of minimum 
criminal procedural rights,118 the pre-Lisbon Treaty Framework did not provide such clear 
legal basis. 
Calls for a minimum defence rights standard became more apparent119 after the adoption of 
the Framework Decision on the EAW, which came short in protection of procedural 
safeguards.120 Whereas the former Article 31(1)(b) TEU provided a clear legal basis for 
‘facilitating extradition between Member States’, it did not provide a similar basis for 
procedural rights action. Therefore the Commission had to resort to a logic of implied 
competences in order to overcome this difficulty, and came up with former Article 31(1)(c) 
                                                          
113 See generally HOL European Union Committee, supra note 106. 
114 Home Office, July 2006. 
115 See J. Spencer, ‘EU Criminal Law- the Present and the Future?’, in A. Arnull, C. Barnard, M. Dougan and E. 
Spaventa (eds.), A Constitutional Order of States? : Essays in EU Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood (Oxford, 
2011), 341-364, at 360. 
116 The other major factor being a lack of EU competence, see the paragraph on ‘legal basis’ below. 
117 V. Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law (Oxford, 2009), 104. 
118 Article 82(2)(b) TFEU, see chapter 1.2 above on Lisbon. 
119 Commentators had earlier already pointed to an absence of minimum defence rights standards, see e.g. S. 
Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (Harlow, 2000), 187. 
120 See e.g. S. Alegre and M. Leaf, ‘Mutual Recognition in European Judicial Cooperation: A Step Too Far Too 
Soon? Case Study- the European Arrest Warrant’, 10(2) European Law Journal (2004), 200-217. 
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TEU as a legal basis. This provision enables common action to be taken on judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters ‘ensuring compatibility in rules applicable in the Member 
States, as may be necessary to improve such cooperation’. In the Commission’s view the 
proposal constitutes the ‘necessary complement’ to the mutual recognition measures that are 
designed to increase efficiency of prosecution.121 The Commission further argued that the 
proposal was necessary to ensure compatibility between the criminal justice systems of 
Member States and to build trust and promote mutual confidence across an EU in which: ‘not 
only the judicial authorities, but all actors in the criminal process see decisions of the judicial 
authorities of other Member States as equivalent to their own and do not call in question their 
judicial capacity and respect for fair trial rights’.122 Even though it is plausible that the 
proposal leads to an enhanced compatibility between (some aspects of) the various criminal 
justice systems, serious objections can be made against the proposed legal basis. Mitsilegas 
has clearly articulated two objections against the Commission’s logic.123 Firstly, the pre-
Lisbon Treaty Framework did not provide for an express legal basis for the adoption of 
criminal procedural measures. In an area ‘which is inextricably linked to State sovereignty’ an 
express legal basis seems necessary, and no Treaty provision reflected Member States’ will to 
legislate on criminal procedure.124 Secondly, the link provided by the Commission of ‘mutual 
trust’ is ‘too indirect and subjective as a legitimate link’.125 In the Commission’s view the 
trust the instrument may create will lead to compatibility, which ultimately has to lead to the 
improvement of judicial cooperation. Therefore it is not compatibility, but the trust it ‘may’ 
create that will improve compatibility. As trust is a fluent concept and its existence can hardly 
be measured it does seem that the Commission’s reasoning is farfetched and establishes too 
indirect and vague a link. 
It should be noted though that only a small group of Member States challenged the 
instrument’s legal basis, a close look at the provisions (articles 29 and 31 TEU) shows that the 
question is merely one of interpretation. Morgan defended an alternative, more ‘progressive’ 
view, according to which ‘the word ‘necessary’ in Article 31(1)(c) should be interpreted as 
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meaning that the measure should facilitate mutual recognition, and not simply the somewhat 
narrower judicial cooperation.’126 
Another view is presented by Loof; he agrees with the Commission that Article 31(1) TEU 
potentially provides a sufficient legal basis for limited EU action on common minimum 
procedural standards; however he finds the way in which the Commission then selects the 
rights to be included in the FDPR problematic.127 If the justification for competence is based 
on the need for mutual trust ‘that justification must also constitute the limiting criterion to EU 
competence’.128 Therefore a methodological constraint should have led to an empirical 
approach towards the selection of the substantive rights. In not doing this the Commission 
leaves itself open to criticism of not respecting the principle of subsidiarity. 
However there are different views on the matter of competence, the Commission failed to 
convincingly and swiftly deal with the matter, which opened the opportunity for the group of 
sceptical Member States to challenge the legal basis. These legal objections combined with 
the political objections led to a failure to reach the required unanimity. According to the JHA 
Council ‘the dividing line was the question whether the Union was competent to legislate on 
purely domestic proceedings or whether the legislation should be devoted solely to cross-
border cases’.129  
3.2. A new attempt: the Roadmap on Procedural Rights 
Not long after the demise of the proposed FDPR the issue of procedural safeguards was 
picked up again by the Swedish Presidency (second half of 2009), as calls remained for EU 
action in this field. However, with the recent failure in mind a different approach was taken 
this time. In accordance with the complexity of the issues the JHA Council agreed on a 
Resolution in 2009, just before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, setting out a 
‘Roadmap’ for the strengthening of procedural rights of suspected and accused persons in 
criminal proceedings.130 The Roadmap identifies several areas for legislative priorities and 
introduces a step-by-step approach, meaning legislation for one area of rights at a time will be 
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focused upon. The Resolution articulates a political commitment to take action on the priority 
areas; however the list is expressly ‘non-exhaustive’. The proposed new measures concern (a) 
translation and interpretation; (b) information on rights and charges; (c) legal advice and legal 
aid; (d) communication with relatives, employers and consular authorities; (e) special 
safeguards for suspected or accused persons who are vulnerable; and (f) a Green Paper on pre-
trial detention. The Commission has responded to this last invitation and issued a Green Paper 
on pre-trial detention in June 2011.131 The rights in the Roadmap correspond to those 
proposed by the Commission earlier in 2004, this is remarkable seen the failure to reach 
agreement on these rights at the time. 
The Roadmap was subsequently incorporated into the Stockholm programme, which sets out 
the EU Justice agenda for the period 2010-2014.132 In line with the non-exhaustive character 
of the Roadmap, the Stockholm programme invites the Commission to examine whether other 
issues (for instance the presumption of innocence), need to be addressed and what further 
elements of procedural safeguards need attention.133 The ‘Action Plan Implementing the 
Stockholm Programme’,134 sets out a detailed timetable for the adoption of the measures 
introduced in the Roadmap.135 With the first proposal due for 2010 and the last for 2013, an 
ambitious plan is set out. However the target on a proposal on legal aid of 2011 has already 
been missed, as will be shown below.   
The following section looks at the current status of each of the proposed measures and what 
progress has been made so far. Work on Measure A had already started in mid-2009. The 
Commission proposed a Framework Decision on the Right to Interpretation and Translation 
for Criminal Suspects,136 and even reached agreement on this Proposal in October 2009.137 
However, the Framework Decision was not adopted in time before the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty and therefore it had to be resubmitted under the new institutional framework.138 
A group of 13 Member States tabled an initiative139 for a Directive,140 based on the political 
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agreement already reached on the Framework Decision.141 Subsequently a (slightly) more 
ambitious proposal was made by the Commission,142 but the Council and the European 
Parliament agreed on the former proposal in the spring of 2010. The Directive was formally 
adopted in October 2010,143 and has to be implemented by the Member States before October 
2013.144  
The Commission submitted its proposal for Measure B, on the right to information about 
rights, in July 2010.145 The Council reached a general approach on this text in December 
2010,146 and tabled a Proposal for the Directive147 on which negotiations with the European 
Parliament started in 2011. These talks have been successful, and this second measure was 
adopted in May 2012.148 Member States have two years to implement these new rules into 
their national legal systems.149  
Council negotiations on Measure C have also started after the Commission presented its 
proposal on a Directive on the right of access to a lawyer and on the right to communicate 
upon arrest in June 2011.150 However, contrary to what was aimed at in the Roadmap, it does 
not deal with the issue of legal aid. The two measures have been separated due to the political 
difficulties surrounding the issue of legal aid. It remains to be seen whether there is truly 
political will to achieve agreement on legal aid. The deadline of 2011 set out in the action 
plan implementing the Stockholm programme, for presenting a proposal on this matter, has 
thus not been made.151 The Council has in the meantime reached a general approach on the 
Directive on the right to access to a lawyer and to communicate upon arrest,152 and is 
currently presented by the Presidency to the European Parliament for further discussion. It is 
expected that this directive will be adopted in spring 2013. Concerning the right to legal aid a 
declaration has been included in the Council general approach that a proposal for ‘a legal 
                                                          
141 The content of the initiative was very much similar to the previously negotiated draft Framework Decision 
on the issue, the only difference being the legal nature; a Directive instead of a Framework Decision. 
142 COM (2010) 82 final, 9 March 2010 Brussels. 
143 ‘Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the right to 
interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings’, (2010) OJ L280/1. 
144 Member States have to ensure full compliance with the Directive by 27 October 2013, ibid, Article 10. 
145 COM (2010) 392/3, 20 July 2010 Brussels. 
146 Council doc. 17503/10, 6 December 2010 Brussels.  
147 Council doc. 16342/11, 11 November 2011 Brussels. 
148 ‘Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the Right to 
Information in Criminal Proceedings’ (2012) OJ L142/1. 
149 Member States have to comply with the Directive by 2 June 2014, ibid, Article 11(1). 
150 COM (2011) 326 final, 8 June 2011 Brussels. 
151 See COM (2010) 171 final, 20 April 2010 Brussels, annex at p. 14. 
152 Council doc. 10908/12, 8 June 2012 Brussels. 
32 
 
instrument’ regarding legal aid will be presented in 2013.153 At the time it is unsure what form 
this ‘legal instrument’ will take and it is feared that the political difficulties surrounding legal 
aid will lead the Commission to present a non-binding instrument (such as a resolution). 
According to the same timetable a Proposal on communication with relatives, employers and 
consular assistance is due for 2012 (Measure D), and has thus been combined with Measure C 
now.  
A legislative proposal on special safeguards for suspected or accused persons who are 
vulnerable (Measure E) should be made during 2013, and an impact assessment is being 
carried out on this Measure. Furthermore the Green-Paper on what other rights ought to be 
covered (Measure F) is scheduled for 2014, and a Commission consultation process ended in 
November 2011. 
Based on the first two proposals one can be positive and hopeful about the execution of the 
targets set in the Roadmap. But as these proposals regard relatively ‘uncontroversial’ topics, a 
more sceptical position can be taken after the failure to include the politically more difficult 
right to legal aid in Measure C.  
A critical look at what these developments mean for the ‘value’ of the Roadmap will be taken 
later. First will be examined what the current level of safeguards throughout the EU is so 
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Chapter 4. The current regime of criminal procedural safeguards in the EU  
4.1. Introduction 
Criminal procedural safeguards, defence rights and fair trial rights are all terms used to 
describe the rights a suspect or accused has in ‘criminal proceedings’ in order to protect 
himself from abuse of government power. Their aim is to ensure a ‘fair trial’. The term 
‘criminal proceedings’ is used here as encompassing all the activities of state agencies, from 
the police to the supreme courts, which take as starting point the suspicion that an offence has 
been committed. A criminal process proceeds through various stages, such as inquiry, 
investigation, charge, indictment, trial, judgement and appeal. There is mostly agreement on 
the core meaning of such proceedings; however there is great variety in the actual manner of 
execution. These differences involve the organization of authorities, distribution of powers 
between the different branches, the organization of the trial and the possibilities to appeal.  
It is often argued that there are two main models of criminal procedure in the EU;154 on the 
one side an accusatorial, adversarial tradition associated with the Anglo-Saxon common law 
jurisdictions, which features two distinct sides (parties) and a judge as neutral arbiter; and on 
the other side an inquisitorial tradition associated with the continental jurisdictions, where a 
judge plays a more active and central role.155 However, jurisdictions that were regarded as 
having the same legal traditions have more recently developed in different ways and therefore 
a clear distinction is sometimes difficult to make.156 These differences between common law 
and civil law jurisdictions complicate the interpretation of Article 6 ECHR- which provides a 
framework for fair trial rights throughout Europe; it is likely that the directives that will be 
adopted under the Roadmap will face similar problems. 
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The idea to limit the abuse of government power by regulating ‘its exercise through 
procedures that are regular, impartial and that give affected persons a chance to be heard is an 
ancient insight of the law.’157 The Magna Carta in 1215 already compelled the King to pledge 
that ‘to no one we will sell, to no one we will deny or delay right or justice’ and that ‘no free 
man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised … or outlawed or exiled or in any wise 
destroyed, nor will we go upon him, nor will we send upon him, unless by the lawful 
judgement of his peers, or by the law of the land’.158 The right to fair trial is nowadays 
guaranteed by constitutions, criminal codes or common law in most countries. 
Fair trial rights are part of the wider concept of ‘international human rights’159 and therefore  
also guaranteed in international treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR)160 which aspires to universal application, and regional treaties such 
as the ECHR and the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR).161 Next to treaties 
there are also numerous declarations, resolutions and recommendations on human rights 
starting with the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR).162 These texts 
certainly have importance even though they are not legally binding. It is important to note 
however that this thesis is about the law, and therefore does not consider such instruments. 
The main human rights instrument within the EU is the ECHR. Even though it is not EU 
legislation as such, all Member States are signatories to the Convention and therefore bound 
by its provisions.163 As this thesis aims at examining the value of the Roadmap it is important 
to test the standard aimed at by the Roadmap against the current standard of defence rights in 
the EU (i.e. how does the Roadmap relate to the standard set by Article 6 ECHR?). 
This chapter aims at providing an overview of the protection offered to suspects in criminal 
proceedings in the EU by analysing Article 6 ECHR. The structure of this chapter is the 
following; first an overview will be given of the aspects of Article 6 that have an overall 
impact on criminal proceedings, subsequently the specific rights enshrined in Article 6(3) 
ECHR that are not contained in the Roadmap will be presented with the purpose of giving a 
complete overview of the protection offered by the ECHR and to show that the Roadmap does 
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not offer an equally broad protection (yet?). The rights contained in Article 6 ECHR that are 
prioritised by the Roadmap are being treated in Chapter 5 and this chapter takes the form of a 
direct comparison. 
After the analysis of Article 6 ECHR here, the by Lisbon formalised EU Charter will be 
reviewed in respect of procedural safeguards in order to see how (if) this instrument affects 
the developments started with the Roadmap.  
4.2. The European Convention on Human Rights 
For European States which are signatories to the ECHR164 the Convention provides the major 
source of international fair trial rights. In particular Article 5 on the right to liberty and Article 
6 on the right to fair trial are of importance for the protection of human rights in criminal 
proceedings.165 Compliance with these norms by Member States is supervised by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),166 which has developed a significant body of case 
law on procedural rights. Actually, the rights provided for in Articles 5 and 6 have been the 
rights most commonly invoked in proceedings before the Strasbourg Court. The Court has 
stressed the importance of the right to a fair trial by stating that ‘the right to a fair trial holds 
so prominent a place in a democratic society that there can be no justification for interpreting 
Article 6(1) of the Convention restrictively’.167 The great volume of applications together 
with the importance of the right shows the position of ‘pre-eminence’168 the right to a fair trial 
has in the Convention.  
An account will be given here of the protection offered by the ECHR for suspects and accused 
in criminal proceedings, along the lines of the Strasbourg jurisprudence. It has to be noted that 
all that can be done here is to highlight some of the leading cases, given the volume and 
extent of the case law.169 
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Article 5 ECHR concerns pre-trial detention and bail, and requires that arrest and detention 
must be lawful and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law. Furthermore it requires 
a ‘reasonable suspicion’ that the person has committed an offence (Art. 5(1)(c)) and that the 
person arrested must be informed ‘promptly, in a language which he understands, of the 
reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him’ (Art. 5(2)). A rule of habeas corpus 
applies (Art. 5(4)) and there is an entitlement to (conditional) ‘release pending trial’ and ‘trial 
within a reasonable time’ (Art. 5(3)).  
The principal provision on defence rights is contained in Article 6 ECHR, on which the rest of 
this analysis (and later comparison) is focussed. In the first paragraph Article 6 mandates that 
everyone facing criminal conviction or a determination of civil rights is entitled to a ‘fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established 
by law’.170 After these general fair trial guarantees, in Article 6(2) and 6(3), it specifies 
certain aspects of this right for those charged with a criminal offence. Article 6(3) makes 
provision for five guarantees which are the minimum rights an accused has in criminal 
proceedings; these are considered as specific aspects of a fair hearing.171 The Court has 
repeatedly confirmed that these rights must be ‘practical and effective’, not ‘theoretical and 
illusory’.172 
4.2.1. Procedural safeguards that have a general impact on criminal proceedings 
The right to be presumed innocent173 
Article 6(2) provides that ‘everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law’. The Strasbourg Court has found that this 
presumption consists of three requirements.174 At first judicial authorities must not presume 
that an accused has committed an offence, unless proven according to law. According to the 
Court, the presumption is violated if ‘without the accused having previously been proved 
guilty according to law and, notably, without his having had the opportunity of exercising his 
rights of defence, a judicial decision concerning him reflects an assumption that he is 
guilty’.175 This can also occur without a formal finding, any reasoning suggesting that the 
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court regards an accused as guilty suffices.176 The presumption of innocence applies during 
all stages of a criminal proceeding, ‘irrespective of the outcome of the prosecution’.177 
However, if the accused is subsequently found guilty the presumption ceases to apply during 
the remains of the proceedings.178 
Second, the presumption of innocence means that the burden of proof lies with the 
prosecution. Thus the prosecution must convince the court of the accused’s guilt; it is not for 
the accused to prove his own innocence. Following on from this; in case there is insufficient 
evidence, the accused must be acquitted, and any doubt should benefit the accused (in dubio 
pro reo).179 The principle furthermore implies that a court’s verdict should be underpinned by 
evidence as presented in court, not on unfounded allegations or mere assumptions.180 
Third, the Court has said ‘that it is for the prosecution to inform the accused of the case that 
will be made against him, so that he may prepare and present his defence accordingly’.181 
The privilege against self-incrimination182 
Often referred to as ‘the right to remain silent’ or the ‘nemo tenetur principle’, this right 
guarantees ‘not to be compelled to incriminate oneself, [and] to be protected against any 
pressure to make a statement’.183 An explicit mention of this fundamental right is absent from 
the text of the ECHR. However the ECtHR has recognised that the right not to incriminate 
oneself and the right to silence are fundamental aspects of a fair trial as they are ‘generally 
recognised international standards which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure 
under Article 6’.184 The guarantee not only includes the right not to speak, but goes further 
and is not limited to verbal expression; this shows how ‘the right to silence’ and the ‘privilege 
against self-incrimination’ are two different things. The ratio of the safeguard can according 
to the Court, inter alia, be found ‘in the protection of the accused against improper 
compulsion by the authorities thereby contributing to the avoidance of miscarriages of justice 
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and to the fulfilment of the aims of Article 6’185 The three justifications given in this sentence 
reflect the central aim of the guarantee; proceedings which do not respect the guarantee are 
not fair. Furthermore the Court held that the guarantee is linked with the right to have access 
to a lawyer, it clarified that ‘early access to a lawyer is part of the procedural safeguards to 
which the court will have particular regard when examining whether a procedure has 
extinguished the very essence of the privilege against self-incrimination’.186 
The principle of equality of arms 
The Court considers the principle of equality of arms to be a fundamental part of the wider 
concept of a fair trial. According to the principle both parties must be allowed a reasonable 
opportunity to present their case under equal conditions, i.e. conditions that do not place either 
party at a disadvantage in relation to his opponent.187 Any limitations on the defence’s rights 
that lead to inequalities have to be sufficiently counterbalanced by procedures followed by the 
judicial authorities.188 Examples of cases in which the Court examined the equality of arms 
requirement can be found in cases concerning ‘access to the case file or the disclosure of 
documents, the questioning of witnesses and experts, or the possibility of responding to, or 
challenging, depositions or observations made by the prosecution’.189 
4.2.2. Article 6(3) ECHR: specific defence rights- not contained in the Roadmap 
The right to adequate time and facilities190 
Article 6(3)(b) provides that everyone charged with a criminal offence has the right to have 
‘adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence’. The right to adequate time 
and facilities is closely linked with the other rights provided for by Article 6, and can be seen 
as a general provision to ‘guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are 
practical and effective’.191  
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The purpose of the right to adequate time is already given in the text itself: to allow for the 
preparation of the defence and to protect the accused against a hasty trial.192 The adequacy of 
the time allowed will depend on the circumstances of the case.193 Relevant circumstances are 
the complexity of the case,194 the stage of proceedings,195 whether the accused is defending 
himself in person,196 and the accused lawyer’s workload.197 Furthermore, if the nature of the 
accusation changes during proceedings, the defence must be allowed sufficient time to 
respond to these changes.198 A breach of Article 6(3)(b) that results from too little time 
allowed for the defence may be rectified in appeal proceedings.199 If one looks at the relevant 
case law a series of diverging decisions will be found. It is therefore difficult to draw general 
conclusions from these decisions. Examples include a judgement in which two weeks for the 
defence to examine a 17.000 page case file was insufficient,200 as was a few hours for a 
defendant who defended himself in a minor public order case.201 However, a five days’ notice 
of a prison disciplinary hearing was found ‘adequate’.202  
‘Facilities’ within the meaning of Article 6(3)(b) ‘include the opportunity [for the accused] to 
acquaint himself, for the purposes of preparing his defence, with the results of investigations 
carried out throughout the proceedings’.203 According to Trechsel this is, in practice, by far 
the most important aspect of the ‘facilities’ available for the defence.204 This right is often 
seen as an element of the concept of ‘equality of arms’,205 the ratio behind it is the principle 
that the defence is ought to have the same information as the prosecution.  
Next to knowledge of the grounds on which the accusation is based, Article 6(3)(b) also 
includes the accused’s right of access to a lawyer at the pre-trial stage and later to the extent 
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necessary to prepare his defence.206 There is an overlap between paragraphs (b) and (c), 
which covers the right to legal assistance.207 
However, there is no limited list of facilities which are covered by Article 6(3)(b). 
Generally it can be said that the Court’s case law has emphasised that a positive obligation 
rests on the authorities to ensure that rights guaranteed by Article 6 are practical and effective. 
Nevertheless, the Court has not clarified the exact meaning of adequate time and facilities. 
The right to call and cross-examine witnesses208 
Article 6(3(d) provides that a person charged with a criminal offence has the right ‘to examine 
or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of 
witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him’. The guarantee is 
part of the wider right to a fair trial, and will generally be looked at by the Court through 
Article 6(1).209 It holds the function of guaranteeing that the adversarial character of the 
proceedings is upheld by ensuring that the defence is given a fair chance to challenge the 
prosecutorial evidence and at the same time to present its own evidence.210 This guarantee 
differs from the other provisions in Article 6(3) by that it is more detailed than some of the 
other rights. 
This guarantee applies to the trial and appeal proceedings, but not to the pre-trial stage.211 The 
rights contained in Article (6)(3)(d) do not hold an absolute character, they can be subject to 
limitations.212 Any limitations must be consistent with the principle of ‘equality of arms’.213 It 
is for national courts to determine whether a witness should be called, an accused requesting 
to hear a witness needs to show the importance of the hearing.214 It is then for the ECtHR to 
assess whether the proceedings as a whole were fair.215 A decision to deny a witness to be 
heard should be adequately motivated.216 
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When evidence is utilised in court which has been produced during police or judicial 
investigation, the right of the accused to cross-examine ‘witnesses against him’ is in principle 
infringed. However, the Court has allowed the introduction of such evidence under certain 
circumstances, examples of which are the prevention of reprisals against witnesses,217 and 
safeguarding police investigations.218 In Kostovski the Court made clear that such evidence 
may be introduced ‘if the rights of the defence have been respected’, this is the case if a 
defendant is given ‘an adequate and proper opportunity to challenge and question a witness 
against him, either at the time the witness was making his statement or at some later stage of 
the proceedings’.219 Even though the Court accepted the introduction of evidence coming 
from anonymous or non-appearing witnesses, even if it is ‘decisive evidence’, in later 
jurisprudence the Court stated that ‘a conviction should not either solely or to a decisive 
extent rely upon anonymous statements’ regardless of the measures taken to secure the rights 
of the defence.220 Thus the use of untested evidence can be justified by ‘counterbalancing’ 
procedures,221 however if this evidence is the sole or decisive basis for conviction, article 
6(3)(d) is violated.222  
In case a conviction is not to a ‘decisive extent’ based upon evidence of non-appearing 
witnesses a balancing test still applies, to examine whether the ‘rights of the defence have 
been respected’. As stated by the Court in Doorson the test is whether ‘the handicaps under 
which the defence labours’ are ‘sufficiently counterbalanced by the procedures followed by 
the judicial authorities’.223  
Regarding the calling of witnesses for the defence, it is for national courts ‘as a general rule to 
assess whether it is appropriate to call witnesses’.224 The ECtHR will only under exceptional 
circumstances assess a national court’s decision on the relevance of the proposed evidence.225  
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4.3. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(hereafter CFR or Charter) has gained formal legal status. As stated by Article 6(1) TEU the 
Charter ‘shall have the same legal value as the Treaties’. Here we will have look at the actual 
value and relevant content of the CFR.226 
The initiative for a Charter on fundamental rights was already taken in 1999 at the European 
Council meeting in Cologne.227 However, it has known a bit of a rocky road before it finally 
obtained legal status.228 The failed Constitutional Treaty sought to incorporate the Charter as 
an integral part of the Treaty. But because a number of Member States229 had doubts about 
whether the Charter should be integrated into the Treaty,230 it was decided in the IGC in June 
2007, as a compromise, that the CFR would not become an integral part of the Treaty, but 
instead a reference to the Charter in Article 6 TEU would state that the Charter has the same 
value as ‘primary law’.231 Both the Charter and Article 6 TEU stress that the CFR ´shall not 
extend in any way the competences of the Union´. It is important to note that the ´Charter 
addresses itself only to the EU institutions and to the legislation they adopt, and not to the 
Member States in national situations´.232 The CFR thus has become legally binding upon EU 
institutions and Member States only when they are implementing EU law. This is nothing new 
in itself, as the ECJ had already stated as early as 1969 that ‘fundamental human rights [are] 
enshrined in the general principles of community law and protected by the Court’,233 and later 
that ‘respect for human rights is … a condition of the lawfulness of Community acts’.234 
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Furthermore the Charter aims at clarifying the tricky relationship between the ECHR, national 
constitutions and the Charter.235 Article 52(3) specifically deals with its relation with the 
ECHR and clearly intends to promote harmony between the provisions of the two documents, 
while not preventing the EU from developing more extensive protection than is provided for 
under the Convention.236 Although it does not deal with the specific relationship between the 
two European Courts, the provisions contained in Articles 52(3) and 53 CFR seem intended to 
promote deference from the ECJ to the case law of the ECtHR.  
The Charter contains defence ‘rights’237 in Title VI ‘Justice’. It sets out the right to a fair 
trial,238 the presumption of innocence,239 the principle of legality and proportionality of 
penalties,240 and the right not to be punished twice for the same offence.241 The benefits of the 
Charter are that the EU has set out in one place fundamental rights from which EU citizens 
can profit,242 and giving the CFR the same legal value as the Treaties is a very powerful 
symbol and underlines that the EU is a Union based on the rule of law and takes rights 
seriously. At the same time ‘citizens might be under the illusion that the Charter will always 
be obligatory for their national authorities, even when the latter are not implementing EU 
law’.243 These high expectations cannot be met by the Charter and taken together with the 
factual legal situation pre-Charter,244 in which the ECJ already recognised fundamental rights 
as part of the EU acquis, the Charter seems to have at its most symbolic value. However, as 
noted by Advocate General Poiares Maduro the Charter ‘is not without effect as a criterion for 
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the interpretation of the instruments protecting the rights mentioned in Article 6(2) EU’.245  
The Charter as such will not have a direct effect on criminal proceedings throughout the EU, 
what it could help assure is that, at least the rights set out in Title VI, are being respected in 
future AFSJ legislation and thus could indirectly have a positive effect on criminal procedural 
rights in the EU. Much of the value of the Charter will depend on the way the ECJ interprets 
the Charter and applies its provisions when reviewing the legality of EU instruments and their 
implementation. In the first years since the Charter is binding the ECJ has referred to the 
Charter on ‘many occasions’.246 
Article 6(2) furthermore opens the way for EU accession to the ECHR. This has been a long 
debated issue and it is to be welcomed that clarity has (finally) been given by the Lisbon 
Treaty.247 The procedure for accession prescribes that consent of the EP is required,248 
together with unanimity in the Council and approval by each Member State.249 EU accession 
to the ECHR250 can be warmly welcomed as it will further strengthen the protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms within the EU, ‘by increasing the uniformity of such 
protection through a fuller integration of the two European systems, while preserving the 
specific features of both’.251 When this happens it will mean that EU institutions will be 
accountable to the ECtHR in respect of matters falling within the scope of the ECHR in the 
same way as Member States are currently bound regarding national matters. Thus, EU 
institutions will be directly subject to the ECHR, and the ECJ can apply the ECHR as if EU 
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Chapter 5. The EU programme on criminal procedural safeguards - A legal analysis of 
the Roadmap and a comparison with the ECHR 
5.1. Introduction 
Because of the before mentioned reasons; the lack of an EU-wide standard for criminal 
procedural safeguards and the overloaded Strasbourg-machinery, it is to be congratulated that 
the EU has committed itself to set a common standard for procedural rights. The main 
questions remains whether the (proposed) instruments will provide added value in making 
defence rights standards more concrete and effective and how they will survive the political 
pressures. The measures that have already been adopted and the measures that have been 
proposed offer the opportunity to closely scrutinize these instruments in order to evaluate their 
contribution to fair trial rights.252 Each section will start with an overview of the standard 
already set by Article 6 ECHR, what follows is a legal analysis of the provisions contained in 
the directives and proposal, and ultimately a close comparison between these two standards, 
in order to test the value of the Roadmap against the standard of the ECHR.  
5.2. Measure A-The Right to Interpretation and Translation    
The Directive on Interpretation and Translation253 is the first EU instrument aimed at 
improving rights for suspects in criminal proceedings and the first directive to be adopted by 
the Council acting by qualified majority together with the European Parliament (co-decision 
procedure). Often observed in literature was that the right to interpretation and translation 
constituted the least controversial one of the rights discussed in the Council,254 and thus 
appeared first on the agenda. This right is also safeguarded by the ECHR and first will be 
examined what protection in this context is being offered by the Convention, subsequently the 
thesis continues with the new Directive and will test its standard against that of the ECHR.   
5.2.1. The right to translation and interpretation as safeguarded by the ECHR255 
Article 6(3)(e) provides that everyone charged with a criminal offence has the right to have 
the ‘free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in 
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court’. The ratio behind this right is that an accused who does not speak the language used in 
the proceedings is clearly disadvantaged.256 Everyone involved in the proceedings benefits 
from this right as it is ‘an essential prerequisite for the proper functioning of the 
administration of justice’.257 The right commences as soon as the suspected or accused person 
receives ‘official notification’ of a criminal investigation and is therefore ‘substantially 
affected’,258 and continues to subsist until the proceedings are concluded, including 
sentencing and appeal procedures.259 The right covers not only (oral) interpretation (as stated 
in the provision), but also translation of documents.260 However, a written translation of every 
document used in the process is not required, only translation has to be provided necessary to 
allow the accused ‘to have knowledge of the case against him and to defend himself, notably 
by being able to put before the court his version of events’.261 This may also require the state 
to ensure a sufficient quality of the interpretation provided; a state does not exempt itself from 
its obligation by merely appointing and paying for an interpreter.262 The Court has 
furthermore clarified that ‘free’ implies a ‘once and for all exemption or exoneration’.263 The 
Court has swiftly declined the suggestion that an accused could be made to pay for 
interpretation if ultimately convicted as this would limit the benefit of the safeguard, 
depriving it of its value ‘for it would leave in existence the disadvantages that an accused who 
does not understand or speak the language used in court suffers as compared with an accused 
who is familiar with that language’,264 ‘a disadvantage the provision sought to attenuate’.265  
The Court has also clarified that an active approach is expected from the judicial authorities, 
they are required to investigate whether the accused does need interpretation. In Cuscani the 
Court found a violation of the provision, even though the accused’s council did not request for 
interpretation, in spite of his client’s lack of sufficient knowledge of English. The Court found 
violations of both Articles 6(1) and 6(3)(e), and held that the ‘ultimate guardian of the fairness 
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of the proceedings was the trial judge who had been clearly apprised of the real difficulties 
which the absence of interpretation might create for the applicant’.266 
5.2.2. Content of Measure A 
In the preamble of the Directive it is stressed, more generally, why there is a need for EU 
action in this area: ‘Although all the Member States are party to the ECHR, experience has 
shown that that alone does not always provide a sufficient degree of trust in the criminal 
justice systems of other Member States’, and ‘Strengthening mutual trust requires a more 
consistent implementation of the rights and guarantees set out in Article 6 of the ECHR. It 
also requires, by means of this Directive and other measures, further development within the 
Union of the Minimum standards set out in the ECHR and the Charter.’267 
The Directive will apply to ‘criminal proceedings’ (not further defined) as well as 
‘proceedings for the execution of a European Arrest Warrant’.268 The rights set out by the 
Directive apply from the moment that a person is made aware of being a suspect of having 
committed an offence until the final determination of the proceedings, including possible 
sentencing and appeal.269 However, it does not apply to ‘minor offences’ imposed by an 
authority other than a criminal court, unless those sanctions are appealed to a criminal 
court.270 It is furthermore made clear that the Directive does not affect national law 
concerning the presence of counsel during proceedings, or concerning the right of access to 
documents during criminal proceedings.271  
The substantive right to interpretation will apply ‘during criminal proceedings before 
investigative and judicial authorities, including during police questioning, all court hearings 
and any necessary interim hearings’.272 It will also apply to communications with legal 
counsel in direct connection with ‘any questioning or hearing during the proceedings or with 
the lodging of an appeal or other procedural applications’.273 The right extends to ‘appropriate 
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assistance for persons with hearing or speech impediments’.274 It is also required for Member 
States to have in place a system to verify the need for assistance,275 and for a decision finding 
that there is no need for interpretation to be challengeable.276 Technology such as 
videoconferencing, telephone or internet communication may be used, ‘unless the physical 
presence of the interpreter is required in order to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings’.277 
This possibility should only be used as a last resort as it is imaginable how it can be difficult 
to assure a high standard without an interpreter physically present.  
At the end of the provision more generally is safeguarded that the interpretation must be ‘of a 
quality sufficient to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings’,278 and especially regarding the 
use of technology this fairness requirement has to be closely watched. 
As for the substantive right to translation, the right requires the written translation, into a 
language the suspected or accused persons understand, of ‘all documents which are essential 
to ensure that they are able to exercise their right of defence and to safeguard the fairness of 
the proceedings’.279 ‘Essential’ in this context includes decisions depriving a person of his 
liberty, any charge or indictment and any judgement,280 and only as far as documents are 
relevant for the person to have knowledge of the case against him.281 In other cases, decisions 
on translation shall be taken by the competent (national) authorities, but the person (or his 
counsel) has the right to ‘submit a reasoned request’ for further translations.282 Also here a 
system must be in place to challenge a decision not to allow a document to be translated.283 It 
is presumed here that a suspect has knowledge about any further documents of relevance, 
and/or that the translation provided is not accurate. For an effectuation of these rights 
assistance of a counsel, who has access to the case file is essential. Whether access to counsel 
and legal aid will be assured depends on the progress of the other measures (especially 
Measure C on access to a lawyer and legal aid).  
As an exception to these general rules an ‘oral translation or oral summary of essential 
documents may be provided instead of a written translation on condition that such oral 
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translation or oral summary does not prejudice the fairness of the proceedings’.284 It is 
important that this exception will not be taken lightly as it can cause difficulties for a defence 
if (especially long) texts are not provided in written form. Furthermore suspects may waive 
their right to translation (not their right to interpretation) at any time, if they ‘have received 
prior legal advice or have otherwise obtained full knowledge of the consequences of such a 
waiver, and that the waiver was unequivocal and given voluntarily’.285 A general right to a 
high quality of translation ‘to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings’ also appears at the 
end of this provision.286 
The Directive assures that Member States will bear the costs of interpretation and translation, 
‘irrespective of the outcome of the proceedings’.287 Article 5 reiterates the requirement for 
‘high quality’ of both services: ‘concrete measures’ shall be taken to give full effect to 
Articles 2(8) and 3(9). In accordance, Member States must ‘endeavour’ to establish a register 
of qualified and independent interpreters and translators, which shall be made, ‘where 
appropriate’, available to counsel and relevant authorities.288 It is unclear when this would be 
inappropriate, ‘as verifying whether the interpreter is registered would be the best mechanism 
of ascertaining their quality’.289 Regrettably this provision is not mandatory; however it 
provides the basis (and possibly an incentive) for Member States to build a register which will 
complement the effective implementation of the Directive. Member States furthermore have 
to train legal professionals (such as judges, prosecutors and other judicial staff) in the process 
of communicating with interpreters as to ensure efficient and effective communication.290 
This is an important provision in the Directive and much can be expected from the training of 
professionals as they ultimately have to deal with the Directive in practice and this provides a 
strong mechanism of improving the judicial proceedings.291 In line with this attempt to 
‘improve’ proceedings and practice in respect of the rights to interpretation and translation, 
Member States are also required to keep record of cases were any of these rights have been 
applied, or where translation rights were waived.292 
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The Directive contains a non-derogation clause stating that nothing in the Directive ‘shall be 
construed as limiting or derogating’ from ECHR rules, the Charter or international or national 
law which provides a higher level of protection.293 
5.2.3. Textual comparison with the ECHR  
Having seen how the right to interpretation and translation is set out by both instruments, the 
thesis turns to the comparative discussion of the provisions of the Directive and those of 
Article 6(3)(e). It is no surprise that there are many similarities between these provisions as 
the EU negotiators have modelled the Directive on the case law of the ECtHR. However, the 
advantage the drafters of the Directive had is that they can make use of the knowledge gained 
over the years in the application of this right, and can further develop and clarify the doctrine. 
The ratio behind the right is equal as both instruments aim at creating equal rights for those 
we do and do not understand the language used in a legal system. 
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293 Article 8. 
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proceedings’, Article 4. 
Figure 1. 
The scope of application of the right as safeguarded by both instruments is ‘practically 
identical’.294 The right applies in both cases to those who do not understand or speak the 
language used in court. The ECtHR has made clear though that this does not mean a 
defendant can select the language used in court; he cannot successfully request on using his 
own language if he is conversant in several languages, including the one utilised in court.295  
The Directive has set the same timeframe for application of the right as developed by the 
ECtHR; namely from the moment a suspect/accused receives ‘official notification’ of the 
criminal investigation (thus from the moment he is ‘substantially affected), and continues 
until the proceedings are concluded (including sentencing and appeal proceedings). 
The Directive does furthermore confirm that the right is free and ensures that Member States 
bear the cost of interpretation and translation, regardless of the outcome of the proceedings. 





Interpretation ‘during criminal proceedings 
before investigative and 
judicial authorities’, this 
includes police questioning 
and all court hearings, Article 
2(1). And also 
communication with counsel, 
Article 2(2). 
At trial, during pre-trial and 
(possibly) in order to allow 
communication with counsel, 
as implicit in Lagerblom v. 
Sweden.  
Translation ‘all documents which are 
essential to ensure that 
[suspects] are able to exercise 
‘those documents necessary 
to allow the accused to 
defend himself’, Kamasinski 
                                                          
294 S. Summers, ‘Comparison of the Provisions of the EU and those of the ECHR on the Procedural Rights of 
Suspects’, Presentation given at the UKAEL Law Workshop, University of Glasgow, 13 May 2011.  
295 ECtHR 25 Novemeber 1997, Zana v. Turkey, No. 18954/91. 
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their right of defence and to 
safeguard the fairness of the 
proceedings’, Article 3(1). 
v. Austria, para. 74.  
Waiver Only the right to translation 
can be waived, under the 
condition that it was 
unequivocal and voluntary, 
Article 3(8).  
Not clarified by the Court, 
see Cuscani v. the United 
Kingdom, paras. 38-40. 
Figure 2. 
As also guaranteed by the ECHR, the Directive’s right to interpretation applies both at trial 
and during pre-trial, and clarifies that it allows for communication with counsel. The ECtHR 
has implicitly confirmed this right in Lagerblom, where the Finnish defendant complained 
about his appointed Counsel’s inability to speak Finnish; however the Court held that the 
defendant did speak sufficient Swedish. The confirmation by the Directive is valuable and 
leaves no doubt to the matter. 
The inclusion of the right to translation in the Directive can also be seen as a welcome 
clarification, this because the right is not explicitly stated in Article 6(3)(e). The Strasbourg 
Court has recognised this right, but now the EU aims at turning this doctrine developed by the 
Court into legislation.  
Another possible improvement can be found in the use of the term ‘essential’. The ECtHR has 
held in Kamasinski that Article 6(3)(e) does cover a right to translation of ‘necessary’ 
documents, it is not further specified what this exactly means. The Directive assures that 
Member States have to provide suspects with a translation of all documents that are essential 
to exercise the right of defence. What this term exactly entails has to be decided the ECJ in its 
future case law, but the Directive provides the Court with a terminological guideline.    
Progress has also been made by the Directive on the matter of waiver. The Directive forbids 
waiver of the right to interpretation and clarifies the circumstances regarding waiver of the 
right to translation. The ECtHR does probably hold a similar position, as can be inferred from 
Cuscani, in which the Court found a violation of Article 6(3)(e) even though the accused’s 
barrister had explicitly ‘waived’ their right to interpretation because they could manage 
without. The Court here required an ‘active’ approach by the judge, as he is the ultimate 
guardian of fairness to ensure that absence of an interpreter would not comprise the fairness of 
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the proceedings. As mentioned before, the Directive does, regrettably, not contain a binding 
provision on national courts’ obligations to ensure effective translation.296  
The main difference between the Directive and Article 6(3)(e) is the fact that the Directive 
applies to proceedings for the execution of a EAW.297 Article 6 ECHR (as a whole) does not 
apply to proceedings concerning extradition because the person concerned is not ‘charged 
under the jurisdiction of the state from which he or she is to be extradited’.298 This ‘lack’ of 
protection for persons subjected to a EAW will be erased step-by-step if the measures 
proposed by the Roadmap will all apply to EAW proceedings. 
Thus the Directive on Interpretation and Translation makes a number of significant 
improvements to the existing ECHR safeguards. These improvements can be found in the 
textual inclusion of the right to translation, the use of the term ‘essential’ in relation to what 
documents have to be translated and the circumstances under which this right can be waived, 
and adding a right to interpretation as regards communication with counsel. Another big 
improvement can be found in the Directive’s application to the EAW. The fact that these 
provisions are contained in a directive means that the Commission has available the ‘ordinary’ 
EU enforcement tools on infringement,299 and thus ensures that Member States will comply 
with these standards that have the potential to not only meet the Strasbourg standard, but 
possibly to even surpass it. 
5.3. Measure B- The Right to Information about Rights and to Information about the 
Charges 
Final agreement on the second measure was reached in May 2012.300 This Directive contains 
two distinct parts. The first part contains the right to information about rights, the needs for 
which have been demonstrated by recent research.301 The second part concerns information 
about the actual charge and access to the case file. A heavily debated aspect of the 
negotiations was how this information should be provided given the variation in approach 
                                                          
296 Article 6 on ‘training’ is useful, but worded non-binding. 
297 Article 1. It also goes beyond the protection set out in the EAW Framework Decision OJ L190/1 (2002), as it 
refers only generally to the right to be assisted by an interpreter in accordance with national law (Article 11(2)), 
and to a right to information about the contents of the Warrant (Article 11(1)), without explicitly requiring a 
translation of the Warrant.  
298 ECtHR 6 February 2003, Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic v. Turkey, Nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, para. 80.  
299 More on this in the general conclusion on the Roadmap in chapter 5.5 below. 
300 For the Directive see (2012) OJ L142/1; for more on its negotiations and adoption see chapter 3.2 above. 
301 Spronken, supra note 87. 
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amongst Member States.302 For instance the right to silence, generally considered as one of 
the most fundamental rights to ensure a fair trial, was not contained in the first Commission 
Proposal. After heavy criticism from the European Parliament and civil rights groups this 
right was eventually added to the proposal.303 Before this thesis turns to the Directive an 
overview will be given of how the right to information is safeguarded in the ECHR, so we can 
later test the new EU instrument against this standard. 
 
5.3.1. The right to information as safeguarded by the ECHR304 
Article 6(3)(a) provides that everyone charged with a criminal offence is to be ‘informed 
promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him’. Article 5(2) provides a similarly worded guarantee for persons 
detained pending trial. Although both provisions provide an individual with a claim to receive 
information on why judicial action has been taken against him, the purpose of the two 
provisions is essentially different. Whereas Article 5(2) enables an arrested person to 
challenge his detention, Article 6(3)(a) is intended to give the accused the information 
essential to answer the charge against him. 
The rationale of Article 6(3)(a) is to ensure a suspect can fully understand the allegations with 
a view to preparing an adequate defence.305 The adequacy of this information should be tested 
not only against paragraph (1)’s general right to a fair hearing, but also against paragraph 
(3)(b)’s guarantee of adequate time and facilities. The accused should be given details of the 
offence(s), victim, locus and dates; the judicial authorities can be required to take additional 
measures in order to ensure an accused effectively understands the information.306 
Prosecuting authorities are required to actively inform the suspect of this information and 
bring it to the attention of the defence, this requirement ‘cannot be complied with passively by 
making information available without bringing this to the attention of the defence’.307  
There are no specific requirements regarding form, but as the purpose of the right is to enable 
the accused to prepare his defence, the information provided must be sufficiently detailed to 
                                                          
302 See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Right to Information in 
Criminal Proceedings: State of Play, Council doc. 15618/10, 29 October 2010 Brussels; and Outstanding Issues 
and Consolidated Text, Council doc. 12163/11, 1 July 2011 Brussels. 
303 See Draft Report of Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 20 December 2010 Brussels, 
2010/0215 (COD). 
304 See Trechsel, supra note 169, 192-207. 
305 Mattoccia v. Italy, para. 60. 
306 ECtHR 19 December 1989, Brozicek v. Italy, No. 10964/84, paras. 41-42. 
307 Mattoccia v. Italy, paras. 58-72 at para. 65. 
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achieve this goal. The information can be provided orally,308 however in case an accused does 
not understand the language a suspect should in principle be provided with a written 
indictment.309 
Next to the requirement to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations a second 
element to the right to information is recognised in the Strasbourg case law. This concerns the 
right to be informed of the defence rights available in the Convention, however this particular 
aspect of the right is not explicitly mentioned in the ECHR. In this case law the Court 
required judicial authorities to take positive measures to ensure effective compliance with 
Article 6.310 This is furthermore specified in the Padalov and Talat Tunc cases, in which the 
Court required an active approach by authorities and required them to inform the accused of 
their specific right to legal aid.311 In Panovits the Court clarified further that judicial 
authorities have a positive obligation to provide the accused with information on the right to 
legal assistance and legal aid, whenever these rights have arisen.312 The Court went on and 
held that authorities must take all steps, within reasonable limits, to make the accused aware 
of his defence rights and understands, as far as possible, the implications of his conduct under 
questioning.313 Concerning the so-called ‘letter of rights’314 the Court found that it is not 
sufficient information as such.  
A third element of the right to information that has been established in the ECtHR case law is 
access to the evidence on which the accusations are based. All material evidence, for and 
against the accused, should be disclosed to the defence, 315 and both parties must be given the 
opportunity to have disclosed and comment upon the observations and evidence of the other 
party.316 In Natunen the Court held that these obligations ‘include the opportunity to acquaint 
himself [the defendant], for the purposes of preparing his defence, with the results of 
investigations carried out throughout the proceedings’.317 However, the right to full disclosure 
                                                          
308 ECtHR 25 March 1999, Pélissier and Sassi v. France, No. 25444/94, para. 53. 
309 Kamasinski v. Austria, para. 79. 
310 ECtHR 13 May 1980, Artico v. Italy, No. 6694/74, para. 36; ECtHR 30 January 2001, Vaudelle v. France, No. 
35683/97, paras. 52, 59 and 60. 
311 ECtHR 10 August 2006, Padalov v. Bulgaria, No. 54784/00; ECtHR 27 March 2007, Talat Tunc v. Turkey, No. 
32432/96. 
312 ECtHR 11 December 2008, Panovits v. Cyprus, No. 4268/04, paras. 72-73. 
313 Ibid, paras. 67-68. 
314 On which more in the context of the Roadmap see chapter 2.2 above. 
315 ECtHR 16 December 1992, Edwards v. the United Kingdom, No. 13071/87, para. 36. 
316 ECtHR 28 August 1991, Brandstetter v. Austria, Nos. 11170/84, 12876/87, 13468/87, para. 66; Jasper v. the 
United Kingdom, para. 51; ECtHR 6 September 2005, Salov v. Ukraine, No. 65518/01, para. 87.  
317 ECtHR 31 March 2009, Natunen v. Finland, No. 21022/04, para. 42; See also Galstyan v. Armenia, para. 84. 
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is not absolute and can be subject to limitations ‘in pursuit of a legitimate aim such as the 
protection of national security or of vulnerable witnesses or sources of information … [any] 
such restriction on the rights of the defence should however, be strictly proportionate and 
counterbalanced by procedural safeguards adequate to compensate for the handicap imposed 
on the defence’.318 Even though the Court recognises that for a criminal investigation to be 
conducted efficiently information obtained can ‘be kept secret in order to prevent suspects 
from tampering with evidence and undermining the course of justice … this legitimate goal 
cannot be pursued at the expense of substantial restrictions on the defence. Therefore, 
information which is essential for the assessment of the lawfulness of a detention should be 
made available in an appropriate manner to the suspect’s lawyer.’319 It is not developed in the 
Court’s jurisprudence when exactly material evidence should be disclosed. 
 
5.3.2. Content of Measure B 
 
The preamble contains the same references as Measure A to the ECHR and the Charter, and 
also stresses the need to enhance mutual trust through setting common minimum rules. This 
proposed measure has the same scope as the Directive on interpretation and translation and 
contains the same exclusion of minor offences.320 Furthermore the Proposal contains an 
identical non-derogation clause as in Measure A,321 and a similar vague training provision for 
professionals.322 
 
As to the substance, it is first ensured that all suspects and accused are provided ‘promptly 
with information concerning at least the following procedural rights as they apply under 
national law’: access to a lawyer, legal advice free of charge, information about the accusation 
(with reference to the definition in Article 6), interpretation and translation and the right to 
silence.323 ‘This information shall be provided either orally or in writing and in simple and 
accessible language, taking into account any particular need of vulnerable suspected or 
                                                          
318 Jasper v. the United Kingdom, para. 43; Edwards v. the United Kingdom, para. 39; ECtHR 24 June 2003, 
Dowsett v. the United Kingdom, No. 39482/98, para. 42. 
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321 Article 10. 
322 Article 9. 
323 Article 3(1). 
57 
 
accused persons.’324 It is subsequently set out that a suspect must be ‘provided promptly with 
a written Letter of Rights’, which they shall be given an opportunity to read and be allowed to 
keep throughout detention,325 stating the rights assured above. The letter is furthermore 
required to contain information (as under national law) on: access to the materials in the case, 
the right to inform consular authorities and a third person, access to urgent medical assistance, 
how long the deprivation of liberty can last,326 and the right to challenge detention.327 Here 
also, this must be drafted in simple and accessible language; for this purpose an indicative 
model letter is annexed.328 The letter must be drafted in a language which the person 
understands, where this is not available the information shall be given orally in a language he 
understands, in this case a letter in a language he understands shall still be given ‘without 
undue delay’.329 The same right as described here applies in European Arrest Warrant 
cases.330 
 
Concerning the substance of the second right contained in the Directive; the right to 
information about the accusation, it is set out that ‘information about the criminal act [a 
person] is suspected of having committed’ shall be ‘provided promptly and in such detail as is 
necessary to safeguard the fairness of the criminal proceedings and effectively exercise the 
person’s right of defence’.331 A suspect should be informed of the reasons for arrest including 
the criminal act he is suspected of having committed at initial detention.332 Member States are 
furthermore required to, ‘at the latest upon submission of the merits of the accusation to a 
court’; provide detailed information concerning the accusation, ‘including the nature and legal 
classification of the offence, as well as the nature of participation by the accused person’.333 
When changes are made to the information, to suspect should be promptly informed of these 
‘where this is necessary to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings’.334 
In addition it is provided that a suspect should have free access to materials.335 An arrested or 
detained person should be able to obtain the relevant documents related to the case which are 
                                                          
324 Article 3(2). 
325 Article 4(1). 
326 Article 4(2). 
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in the possession of the prosecuting authorities; relevant documents are those ‘essential to 
effectively challenge’ the detention ‘according to national law’.336 More generally it is stated 
that Member States shall provide access to all material evidence in the possession of the 
competent authorities ‘for or against the suspected or accused person’, with the purpose of 
safeguarding ‘the fairness of the proceedings and to prepare the defence’.337 Access to these 
materials shall be granted at ‘the latest upon submission of the merits of the accusation to the 
judgement of the court’.338 This provision is rather awkwardly drafted as it could result in 
materials being submitted to the defence at a moment too late to ensure a preparation of the 
case in line with the requirements of the ECHR. In some Member States this provision would 
allow for the submission of these materials at the presentation by the prosecution of the case 
at trial and not any earlier. 
 
Access to materials may be limited, unless this would prejudice the right to a fair trial, if it 
leads to serious risk to life or the fundamental rights of another person, or if it is strictly 
necessary to safeguard an important public interest, such as prejudicing an ongoing 
investigation or where it may seriously harm national security.339 The decision not to disclose 
certain materials must be taken by a judicial authority or at least be subject to judicial review. 
 
A suspect has the right to challenge ‘the possible failure or refusal of the competent 
authorities to provide the information’.340 However, the provision lacks clarity on a duty to 
inform a suspect on whether access has been limited. Clearly no challenge can be made by the 
defence if they were not made aware of the existence of certain material. This omission makes 
the effectivity of the provision questionable. 
 
As mentioned before, an indicative model letter of rights is annexed to the Directive for both 
national cases and EAW cases. These letters are inspired by the model developed in a study 
conducted on the way suspects throughout the EU are informed of their rights in writing 
during criminal proceedings. 341 The model letters are examples of simple and accessible 
language usage in order to explain what rights are available.342 Both model letters list what 
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rights a suspect or accused person is entitled to and subsequently explains these rights in more 
detail. These explanations are simple and clear, and do not consist of references to the legal 
codes in which the rights originate. The model letters have been criticised for having a limited 
scope, focusing on the first stages after arrest.343 These remarks seem fair as the full scope of 
the instrument is not reflected in the model letters. However, these model letters are only 
meant to be ‘indicative’ for Member States and it thus remains to be seen how Member States 
will actually draft these letters in practice. But it is clear that if the later stage of proceedings 
will not be included in letters, the full potential of the measure will not be used, in this light 
particularly can be thought of information on appeal possibilities. 
 
5.3.3.   Textual comparison with the ECHR 
 
Again there are many similarities between the right to information as provided for by the 
Directive and the right as developed by the ECtHR. Here both instruments are compared to 
get an insight into what the similarities are and where possible differences can be found. 
 






Information about procedural 
rights 
Provided promptly with 
information on procedural 
rights, including access to a 
lawyer, legal aid, information 
on the accusation and 
interpretation and translation, 
Article 3(1). 
To be made aware of certain 
procedural rights, see 
Panovits v. Cyprus, paras. 
72-73, including access to a 
lawyer, information on the 
charge, access to the file and 
right to an interpreter. 
Written information about 
rights (letter of rights) 
Promptly at arrest, Article 
4(1). For EAW proceedings 
see Article 5. 
A written notification alone 
may not suffice, see Panovits 
v. Cyprus. 
Figure 3. 
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Article 6 ECHR does not expressly set out the right to information about procedural rights, 
the right to information on the charge being an exception. The ECtHR has ruled in Panovits 
and Padalov that the accused should be informed of his right to counsel, the Court required 
the judicial authorities to actively assure that applicants knew that they could request for legal 
advice free of charge. A similar positive obligation is contained in the Directive. Likewise, the 
ECHR does not expressly provide for a right to be informed of the right to an interpreter. 
From Cuscani it however became clear that if an accused cannot participate effectively 
because of a lack of an interpreter, and judicial authorities do not act, it is likely to be a 
violation of Article 6(3)(e). 
The right to be brought promptly before a judge is also not explicitly mentioned in the ECHR. 
The ECtHR has however ruled that this must happen automatically, thus without the accused 
requesting for a hearing. Authorities are required to do so within a 96 hours period of the 
accused’s detention.  
Here, as was also the case with Measure A, it is shown that the Directive makes explicit 
mention of rights already developed by the ECtHR, but not explicitly mentioned in the text of 
Article 6. This codification of doctrine developed in the Court’s case law over the years is a 
strengthening of the position of the defence as, under the EU regime, they can directly refer to 
a codified provision. 
Furthermore the requirement to provide suspects or accused with a letter of rights is not 
included in the ECHR, although this is practice in a number of Member States. With reference 
to this already existing practice the value of inclusion of this right in the Roadmap was often 
not considered as ‘ground breaking’,344 however recent study has shown that this practice is 
not as widespread and effective as often presumed and therefore inclusion in the Directive can 
become valuable.345 The Strasbourg ‘view’ on the letter of rights is that provision of a letter of 
rights on its own does not dismiss judicial authorities of taking other action. Even after 
issuing a suspect with such a letter; Member States remain obliged to positively ensure that a 
suspect is fully aware of his rights. This is an example of how rights secured by the Directive 
can be further strengthened by looking at both ‘systems’ of protection in a ‘harmonious’ way. 
The Directive explicitly states that suspects have to be provided with a letter of rights, and the 
ECtHR in its turn points out that this on its own does not necessarily dismiss judicial 
authorities from their other obligation to ensure that the suspect is provided with sufficient 
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information regarding his rights. An example like this shows that both instruments in the 
future might cooperate and complement each other, and where one instrument lacks a 
safeguard, the other might provide it. 






Information about the charge ‘promptly and in such detail 
as is necessary’, Article 6(1); 
detailed information of the 
accusation and the nature of 
participation, Article 6(3). 
‘promptly and in a language 
which he understands and in 
detail about the nature and 
cause of the accusation’, 
Article 6(3)(a). For 
information about facts see 
Mattoccia v. Italy, and for the 
law see Pélissier and Sassi v. 
France. 
Figure 4. 
The requirement of Article 6 Directive that a suspect/accused is provided with both a detailed 
description of the charge against him and information about the nature and classification of 
the offence is similar to the requirement in Article 6(3)(a) ECHR that the accused be informed 
in detail of the ‘nature and cause of the accusation’, and thus provides us with another 
example of how the measures adopted in line with the Roadmap set a standard identical to the 
Strasbourg standard. It can be noted though that it is not yet clear what exactly ‘in such detail 
as is necessary’ means, whereas the ECHR is clearer in stating ‘in detail’. Here again, it is 
only when these instruments enter into force that we will be able to see how these norms have 
been interpreted by the Member States and ultimately how the ECJ views this. Important for 
our purposes is to determine that in some instances the provisions contained in the various 
directives clarify certain issues, but in other instances (like here) lead to the opposite, as they 
leave room for a variety of interpretations. 







Article 6(1), 6(3)(b) and Art. 
5 
On arrest Access to documents in the 
case-file which are essential 
to challenge ‘the lawfulness 
of the arrest or detention’, 
Article 7(1). 
Access to documents relevant 
to challenge the lawfulness of 
the detention, see Lamy v. 
Belgium346; Lietzow v. 
Germany347, Article 5(3) and 
5(4). 
For preparation of defence Access shall be granted ‘in 
due time to allow the 
effective exercise of the right 
of defence’, Article 7(3). 
Access to enable defence to 
exercise the right to be heard, 
Article 6(3)(b) and 6(1). 
Upon conclusion of the 
investigation 
‘all material evidence’ in 
possession of authorities, 
Article 7(2); ‘at the latest 
upon submission of the 
merits of the accusation to 
the judgement of a court’, 
Article 7(3); certain 
documents may be refused by 
judicial authorities, Article 
7(4). 
Access to the case-file in 
order to enable the defence to 
exercise the right to be heard 
in pursuit of the principles of 
adversarial proceedings and 
the principle of equality of 
arms, Article 6(3)(b) and 
6(1). 
Figure 5. 
The new EU instrument assures for the accused access on arrest to the ‘documents related to 
the specific case’ necessary to challenge ‘the lawfulness of the arrest or detention’. The 
ECtHR has also specified that in the context of Article 5 ECHR an accused should have 
access to the ‘relevant evidence’ to enable him an effective challenge of the lawfulness of his 
detention. In earlier versions of the proposal for a Directive on the right to information 
reference was made to ‘case-file’ instead of ‘documents related to the specific case’.348 The 
term ‘case-file’ however can cause uncertainty as in some national legal systems there is no 
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provision for a case-file as such. Therefore a text closer to the Strasbourg jurisprudence was 
chosen in the latest and final proposal in order to cover all relevant documents in all 
jurisdictions. The right to access to the case-file is another example where the Directive 
incorporates a practice developed by the Strasbourg Court which is not explicitly mentioned 
in the ECHR. 
Regarding the effective preparation of defence and the opportunity to challenge pre-trial 
detention the time limit as set by the Directive349 is important. As noted earlier this provision 
is rather unclear and can potentially cause a substantial delay in provision of documents. It 
seems that the ECHR provides a more useful standard as it ensures access to documents in 
order to enable a suspect to exercise his right to be heard.350 Thus according to the ECHR 
documents have to be provided in time for a suspect to exercise his right to be heard, a 
protection equally provided by the Directive, however the added sentence of ‘the latest upon 
submission’ of a case to a court is rather awkward and potentially threatens the effectiveness 
of the provision. Here it is obvious that the right as assured by the case law of the ECtHR 
provides a more useful and valuable safeguard.  
Lastly, at the conclusion of the investigation, the defence is entitled to the full case-file in 
accordance with both instruments. The EU Directive specifies further under what 
circumstances exceptions are permitted and prescribes this decision to be taken by a judicial 
authority or at least being under scrutiny of judicial review. Here the Directive foresees in a 
necessary protection for the suspect/accused as the decision to not (or not completely) 
disclose the case-file, which can have far-reaching implications for the person involved, has to 
be made either by a judicial authority or can be scrutinised by such an authority. The other 
side to this story however, as mentioned before, is that there is no mention of an obligation for 
authorities to inform the defence of such a non-disclosure, which significantly weakens this 
essential safeguard. 
5.4. Measure C- The Right of Access to a Lawyer and the Right to Communicate Upon 
Arrest351 
The Directive implementing Measure C of the Roadmap was proposed by the Commission in 
June 2011.352 After negotiations on this proposed directive started in July 2011,353 a general 
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351 See also C. Heard and R. Schaeffer, ‘Making Defence Rights Practical and Effective: Towards an EU Directive 
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approach has now been reached by the Council and negotiations with the European 
Parliament are ongoing,354 it is anticipated that a final agreement will be adopted in spring 
2013. The proposal aims at approximating national law on access to a lawyer and on the right 
to communicate upon arrest. Contrary to what was agreed in the Roadmap, the instrument 
does not deal with the politically difficult issue of legal aid. At the same time it does include 
the right to consular assistance and notification of a third person as initially was set out to be 
arranged in Measure D.  
The right of access to a lawyer is often considered as the most essential of procedural 
safeguards, this because a lawyer is able to introduce a suspects to all other rights to which he 
is entitled, something of which suspects quite often do not possess knowledge. What follows 
is a short study of how the right on access to a lawyer is safeguarded by the ECHR; this study 
includes also the right to free legal assistance in order to lay out the full, much broader, 
protection offered by the Convention in this context. 
5.4.1. The right to (free) legal assistance and to defend oneself as safeguarded by the 
ECHR 355  
Article 6(3)(c) guarantees that everyone charged with a criminal offence has the right to 
‘defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not 
sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so 
require’. The purpose of this provision is to ensure that proceedings against an accused ‘will 
not take place without an adequate representation of the case for the defence’.356 The 
accused’s lawyer serves as the ‘watchdog of procedural regularity’,357 ‘both in the public 
interest and for his client’.358 Article 6(3)(c) applies to all stages of the criminal process.359 
Concerning the pre-trial stage, the provision will be infringed ‘if and insofar as the fairness of 
the trial is likely to be seriously prejudiced’ by a failure to comply with it at that stage of the 
proceedings.360 
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The right to a defence, as in Article 6(3)(c), contains three guarantees: the right to defend 
oneself in person, the right to legal assistance and the right to free legal aid.361  
Right to self-representation 
According to Article 6(3)(c) the accused does have the right to defend himself in person. 
However, the right to self-representation is not an absolute right.362 Member States are 
allowed a ‘margin of appreciation’,363 and in certain cases may require compulsory 
appointment of a lawyer if the interests of justice so require.364 Relevant circumstances 
include the subject matter of the case, the complexity and legal issues, and the personality of 
the accused,365 or when an appeal is lodged.366 
Legal assistance367 
An accused who does not defend himself in person is entitled to have legal assistance either 
through a lawyer by his own choosing, or at the expense of the state, the latter is dependent on 
the presence of certain conditions though. Legal assistance means advice and representation, 
both in and out of court.368 The state cannot require an accused to defend himself in person.369 
The right of the accused ‘to defend himself … through legal assistance of his own choosing’ 
is the most absolute right contained in Article 6(3)(c),370 and is one of the fundamental 
features of a fair trial.371 A suspect represented by a lawyer is in a better position regarding 
his rights, both because he is better informed on his rights and because his lawyer ensures his 
rights are being enforced. 
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Furthermore, when the accused is represented by a lawyer, his own presence at the trial is also 
guaranteed.372 Even though as a general rule the accused can choose his own lawyer, 373 a 
state may refuse to recognise it for ‘relevant and sufficient’ reasons.374 
Legal aid375 
Article 6(3)(c) also provides for a right to legal assistance free of charge. Whether an accused 
is indigent and requires legal aid is in first instance for the national authorities to determine, as 
a ‘margin of appreciation’ applies, however the Strasbourg Court remains competent to 
review their assessment.376 
An accused’s right to free legal aid is subject to two conditions, first the accused must lack 
‘sufficient means’ to pay for legal assistance, and second when the interests of justice so 
require.377 Even though the accused needs to show that he lacks ‘sufficient means’, he does 
not have to prove ‘beyond all doubt’ that he lacks the means to pay for his assistance.378 The 
Court has furthermore identified three factors that should be taking into account in 
determining whether the ‘interests of justice’ require legal assistance. First, the seriousness of 
the offence and the possible sentence;379 in Benham the Court stated that where any 
‘deprivation of liberty is at stake, the interests of justice in principle call for legal 
representation’.380 Second, the complexity of the case; in Gutfreund the Court suggested that 
the more complicated a case was, either on the law or on the facts, the more likely that legal 
aid is required.381 Third, the personal situation of the defendant; the capacity of the accused 
would be tested in order to find out whether he could present his case.382  
                                                          
372 F.C.B. v. Italy. 
373 Goddi v. Italy, p. 5. 
374 Croissant v. Germany, para. 30. 
375 See also Harris et al., supra note 168, 317-319. 
376 Decision on the Admissibility of Correia de Matos v. Portugal, p. 315. 
377 Pakelli v. Germany, para. 34. 
378 In Pakelli v. Germany this formula was applied and satisfied as the applicant had spent two years in custody 
prior to the case, provided evidence of means to the Commission that made them decide to award him legal 
aid in lodging his ECtHR application, and had also offered to provide the West German Federal Court with 
evidence, see para. 34. 
379 ECtHR 24 May 1991, Quaranta v. Switzerland, No. 8398/78, para. 34. 
380 ECtHR 10 June 1996, Benham v. the United Kingdom, No. 19380/92, para. 61; In this case it concerned a 
potential three months’ imprisonment for non-payment of community charge. 
381 ECtHR 12 June 2003, Gutfreund v. France, No. 45681/99, para. 40.  
382 Quaranta v. Switzerland, paras. 35-36. 
67 
 
The right to choose a lawyer can be subject to limitations, in particular in cases where the 
state pays for the defence,383 even though the wishes of the accused must be taken into 
account. The Convention does not explicitly require judicial authorities to inform suspects on 
their right to (free) legal assistance, however the Court has made clear that such obligation 
does exist and states must ‘actively and adequately’ inform suspects of their right to legal 
representation.384  
5.4.2. Content of Measure C 
The right of access to a lawyer is a good example of the great variety of legal systems 
throughout the EU, evidenced by the differences between when this right entails and what a 
lawyer is entitled to do. Often these differences can be attributed to the differences between 
adversarial and inquisitorial systems, but the Strasbourg court has uniformly stressed the 
importance of a lawyer in criminal proceedings. In this context the recent Salduz385 ruling is 
of paramount importance,386 in which the Grand Chamber established the right of access to a 
lawyer from the first interrogation by the police where the information gained is used to 
further proceedings as a fundamental aspect of a fair trial. In the subsequent Dayanan ruling 
the Court further specified how that right can be made practical and effective.387 
The Commission proposal was a clear attempt to bring these elements into an EU instrument 
which at the same time adds value to the Strasbourg body of law.388 The proposal was drafted 
in a broad manner aiming at including persons at the outset of an investigation who, because 
of tactical reasons practiced by police to dodge suspect’s rights applying, may be seen as 
witnesses or suspects of less serious crimes.389 However this broad approach and inclusion of 
people ‘at the outset’ has not survived the first reading by the Council. It is the text on which 
the Council has reached a general approach that will be analysed here, as this is the most 
recent text. It has to be noted that this is not going to be the final text as the Parliament will 
have differing views and it is to be expected that they would prefer a version of the text closer 
to the initial Commission proposal. 
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The proposed Directive has a different scope from Measures A and B and more stringent 
conditions are required for this instrument to apply.390 Limitations as regarding minor 
offences are still to be debated as Member States differ on the question what offences to 
exclude from the scope of the instrument.391 There are sounds that these minor offences might 
be extended to also cover courts martial and other procedures.392 If this further limitation 
would become reality it would be a serious limitation and the justification for this is unclear at 
the moment. 
Access to a lawyer 
The central provision provides for access to a lawyer ‘in such a time and manner so as to 
allow the person concerned to exercise his rights of defence practically and effectively’.393 
This is in any event, whichever is the earliest, either before any questioning by the police or 
other law enforcement authorities; or upon carrying out any procedural or evidence gathering 
act; or as soon as practically possible after the deprivation of liberty; or before a suspect 
appears before a criminal court.394 The right as proposed by the Commission applies thus 
from the first interrogation, regardless where and under what circumstances this takes place, 
in line with the Salduz ruling. Debate has taken place as to how this works in practice, and it 
will prove to be useful only if questioning does not take place until at the police station where 
interrogation can be properly recorded and a lawyer can be present. However, after first 
reading the Council has proposed to amend the text to include ‘formal questioning’, instead of 
‘from the first interrogation’. This new wording requires further clarification as to what 
‘formal’ in this context means. The danger of this new wording is that Member States might 
misuse this provision and interpret this in such a way that certain forms of questioning, which 
for instance take place before the first official interrogation or outside the police station, fall 
outside the scope of the Directive and thus not assure the Salduz standard. 
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As to the content of the right; a suspect or accused person is entitled to communicate with his 
lawyer, and for his lawyer to be present and participate when he is officially interviewed, 
which shall be recorded in accordance with national law.395  
The Commission proposal contained a broader and more detailed provision on what a lawyer 
was allowed to do (this included asking questions, request clarification and make 
statements).396 Furthermore, in the initial proposal a lawyer had the right ‘to check the 
conditions in which the suspect or accused person is detained’;397 it was however questioned 
by Member States whether this is a role for lawyers, and even if so whether this is the place to 
deal with this. A further amendment made to the Commission Proposal is the inclusion of 
paragraph 4. After debate in the Council on what ‘access’ meant in practice it was set out that 
a distinction exists between cases in which a person is deprived of his liberty and cases in 
which this does not happen. If a person is deprived of liberty he should be ‘in a position to 
effectively exercise his right of access to a lawyer’.398 Furthermore an important change to the 
initial proposal has been made by the Council by including a ground for derogation to Article 
3. Member States may ‘in exceptional circumstances and in the pre-trial stage only’ 
temporarily derogate from the right to a lawyer, when this is ‘justified by compelling reasons 
in the light of the particular circumstances of the case’.399 This derogation undermines the 
effectiveness of the instrument as it provides Member States with a possibility to deny 
persons deprived of liberty of their right to a lawyer. This has already been contested in the 
Council and it is expected that the European Parliament will further challenge this ground for 
derogation.  
The provision on confidentiality provides that confidentiality applies to all methods of 
communications. Thus not only confidentiality of communication in person, but also of 
correspondence, telephone conversations and other forms of communications as permitted 
under national law.400 Derogation is allowed when justified by ‘compelling reasons’, being an 
‘urgent need to prevent serious crime’, or when there is ‘sufficient reason to believe that the 
lawyer concerned is involved in a criminal offence with the suspect or accused person’.401 
This provision has been the most controversial as in the Council a group of Member States 
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did not want any exceptions to this principle.402 It is to be expected that the Parliament will 
not support this derogation either, thus this provision will be further debated and it would only 
increase the strength of the instrument if such derogations would be dropped. 
Communication upon arrest 
The other component of the proposed Directive, communication with a third person, is of 
equal importance as the right to council. Contact with the outside world is an essential 
safeguard against human rights violations such as ill-treatment and enforced disappearance. It 
furthermore ensures that a suspect’s private matters are being dealt with and also enables a 
challenge to the detention. However, even though the right to communicate with a consular 
assistant is included in the proposal, it does not guarantee an equal standard as the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations, which guarantees to communicate ‘in person’.403 
Regarding communication upon arrest it is set out that a person who is deprived of his liberty 
‘has the right to have at least one person, such as a relative or employer, named by him, 
informed of the deprivation of liberty without undue delay’.404 Here again is the standard set 
by the Commission Proposal lowered as in the initial text was provided for communication 
with a third person, instead of having a third person ‘informed’. Also a ground for derogation 
is added allowing for Member States to temporarily derogate from this right when this is 
‘justified by compelling reasons in the light of the particular circumstances of the case’.405 
This broad derogation could seriously undermine this right as it is not further specified what 
such ‘compelling reasons’ are. In case the suspected or accused person is a non-national he 
has the right to have the consular authorities ‘informed’ of the detention as soon as possible 
and is allowed to communicate with them.406 Here the Council added the possibility for 
Member States to ‘set the terms of such communication’, it is unclear what this vague 
provision aims at, but here again it leaves room for Member States to abuse this and allow for 
restrictions. These important rights are already assured by the majority of Member States,407 
and it is unclear why the Council added further ‘conditions’ to these rights. 
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Derogation and waiver 
The Council has included a provision on derogation stating the general conditions for 
derogation under Articles 3(5), 4(2) and 5(3).408 It provides that derogations made under this 
instrument should not go ‘beyond what is necessary’, ‘shall be limited in time as much as 
possible’, shall not only be based on the ‘type of the alleged offence’ and ‘shall not prejudice 
the overall fairness of the proceedings’. 409 Derogations have to be reasoned and authorised by 
a competent authority and should be subject to judicial review.410 What provisions will 
eventually be allowed to derogate from and under what specific circumstances will be a topic 
of further debate and the Parliament will play an important role to counter the tendency to 
extend derogation grounds. 
A waiver of the right to assistance of a lawyer is subject to conditions to ensure that a suspect 
is fully aware of the consequences of his decision. The importance of this provision cannot be 
underestimated as police officers often advise suspects not to request a lawyer as this only 
slows down proceedings or because there would be no need for a lawyer.411 Under the current 
proposal a waiver is only valid if ‘the suspect or accused person has been provided with 
sufficient information so as to allow him to have adequate knowledge about the content of the 
right concerned and the possible consequences of waiving it’ and when ’the waiver is given 
voluntarily and unequivocally’.412 Even under these conditions it remains essential for 
suspects to have an understanding of the benefits of legal assistance; this could for instance be 
achieved by explaining this in the letter of rights. The Council has changed ‘legal advice’ to 
‘sufficient information’; this might allow suspects to waive their right to a lawyer without 
having ever seen one. The Parliament has already voiced a concern and also wants to include 
that a waiver cannot apply for children.  
Application in EAW proceedings 
The right of access to a lawyer in EAW proceedings is an essential part of the Directive, but 
has already led to adjustments. In the initial Commission proposal a right of access to a 
lawyer in both the issuing state and the executing state of an EAW was contained. This would 
be a major improvement in terms of legal protection within the EU. A lawyer in the issuing 
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state can play an important role in advising on the national law and negotiating the execution 
of the warrant with the issuing Member State. This could streamline proceedings and 
significantly increase the rights protection of the person involved. However, a majority of 
Member States has already made clear that this would go much further than the Framework 
Decision on the EAW allows for and should therefore not be included. The current proposal 
thus only provides for ‘access to a lawyer upon arrest … in the executing Member State’.413 
Furthermore the Proposal contains a provision ensuring that the Directive is ‘without 
prejudice to national law in relation to legal aid’. What this inclusion exactly ‘politically’ 
means is unsure, hopefully this does not mean this is all the Council can agree on concerning 
the topic of ‘legal aid’. 
Lastly it is apparent from the proposal that a provision on training (such as contained in 
Measure A) is absent. In the context of this right such a provision could particularly be useful 
to ensure a uniform standard of defence across the EU and to improve knowledge of the 
instrument amongst practitioners.  
5.4.3. Textual comparison with the ECHR 
One of the most relevant questions regarding the Directive on access to a lawyer is whether it 
meets the standard set by the ECtHR in Salduz. If so the EU can more effectively assure 
compliance with this standard since it is better equipped than the Strasbourg Court to do so. It 
has to be noted that this comparison will show even more signs of a provisional comparison 
than the previous two, as the negotiations are currently ongoing and it is difficult to predict in 
what direction negotiations are leading. 
Right to legal advice 
 Proposed Directive 
Council doc. 10908/12 
ECHR 
Article 6(3)(c) 
The moment at which the 
right of access to a lawyer 
arises 
Access to a lawyer is granted 
‘without undue delay’ and in 
any event before a suspect is 
‘officially interviewed by the 
police’, Article 3(2). 
‘access to a lawyer should be 
provided as from the first 
interrogation of a suspect by 
the police’, Salduz v. Turkey, 
paras. 54-55. 
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Content of the right Suspect has the right to meet 
with his lawyer, Article 3(3); 
and for the lawyer to be 
present and participate in 
interviews, Article 3(3). 
Communication is 
confidential, Article 4. 
Derogations allowed, Article 
4(2). 
Lawyers should be able to 
visit and speak with their 
clients in confidence, Zagaria 
v. Italy.414 
Restrictions Derogation is only permitted 
if ‘compelling reasons’ 
require so, Articles 3(5), 4(2), 
5(3) and 7. 
Only if ‘compelling reasons’ 
are demonstrated, Salduz v. 
Turkey, para. 54. 
  Figure 6. 
The Commission proposal followed closely the rules set out by the Salduz doctrine. Added 
value was found in the precise provision on the content of the right (competences of a 
lawyer), although this is also guaranteed by the ECHR under ‘effective defence’. An 
important element of the Directive is the guarantee of presence of the lawyer. Presence of 
lawyers during police detention and interrogation is essential in order to ensure decent 
treatment and effective defence. In some Member States physical presence of lawyers is not 
always guaranteed.415 The text after first reading in the Council has lowered the standard set 
by the Commission and does not meet the Salduz requirements in this form. The ECtHR has 
stated that a lawyer should be provided as from the first interrogation, where the text agreed 
by the Council speaks of an ‘official interview’, which leaves room for speculation as to what 
such an ‘official interview’ is.  
It cannot be denied that the proposal as tabled by the Commission is an ambitious instrument 
as it contains an effective right to legal assistance. However, it faces a difficult negotiation 
phase because in some of the (inquisitorial) Member States the right for a lawyer to be present 
during interrogation is not guaranteed,416 this in spite of what the ECtHR has decided in 
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Salduz. In some other Member States access is not granted immediately upon arrest,417 or can 
be restricted when the interests of the investigation require.418 The financial consequences of 
a directive which provides suspects with such a right can be an obstacle for some Member 
States, especially in times of austerity Member States do not want to see an increase in their 
legal aid expenditure.  
Even though the right to legal aid is stalled for the moment, it is not hard to imagine that 
Member States will have the financial consequences in the back of their minds. These 
political difficulties can be further illustrated by a note issued by a group of Member States 
which raises concerns about the proposed directive.419 It can therefore only be hoped that 
negotiations will result in a strong directive that actually sets an effective EU standard for the 
right to legal advice. However the General Approach reached by the Council does not provide 
us with such hope. The Parliament has an important role to play to counter the minimalistic 
approach demonstrated by the Council. 
What also becomes very clear from our analysis is that the right contained in Article 6(3)(c) 
and as developed by the ECtHR contains a much broader right as it consists of three elements. 
The Directive has dropped the right to legal aid from the agenda and therefore whatever 
results will be achieved, for many suspects they will be meaningless since they don’t have the 
means for legal assistance. This is especially important because the right to legal aid as 
protected by the ECHR is subject to strict conditions and does not apply in all cases in which 
legal aid is necessary. Therefore it can be concluded that whereas the previous two directives 
show very positive results and introduce a serious standard that leads to an actual 
improvement in terms of rights available to suspects in the EU; the Council’s take on this 
instrument do not seem to lead to such a high standard and fails to meet the high expectations 
raised by the Roadmap.  
5.5. Taking all the pros and cons together: what is the actual legal value of the 
Roadmap?  
Setting minimum standards for procedural rights in the EU has known a rocky road, but since 
the Roadmap has been adopted progress has been made and the question arose whether these 
efforts really strengthen procedural safeguards?  
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It seems that there is agreement in the literature that there is a need for a set of EU provisions 
on procedural rights to balance the current crime control bias.420 At the same time there are 
differing views on whether the Roadmap can actually add value to the existing level of 
safeguards. From a sceptical point of view one could question the attempts made by the 
Roadmap. In doing this often is pointed towards the standard already set by the ECHR. 
Summers supports this view as she is unsure whether the EU provisions add much additional 
protection and fail to properly consider the successes and failures of the ECHR.421 Also the 
question is raised whether the rights in the Roadmap are not formulated in such a way that all 
criminal procedures can achieve them without making amendments (common denominator 
argument). Common to most of this critique is that it was formulated before the first directive 
in line with the Roadmap was adopted, therefore it can be said that now we have seen some of 
the measures set out in the Roadmap adopted, it is the time to respond to this criticism. 
More specific critique of the measures; regarding the letter of rights it is said that such letters 
already exist in many countries and the right of access to a lawyer is relatively uncontroversial 
post-Salduz. But the current problem is not with access to a lawyer, but with the moment 
when this right arises and with the guarantee of free access to counsel. Many people will be 
unable to exercise their right to counsel due to an inability to pay or will not be allowed the 
assistance of a counsel at their first hearing. The scepticism around the Roadmap is 
understandable taking into consideration that in its current form Measure C does not 
incorporate the Salduz standard together with the decision not to include a right to legal aid. 
Negative developments as these contribute to the main concern that the EU is not really 
interested in going beyond the protections set out in Article 6 ECHR. However, from a less 
sceptical perspective three main points can be raised that lead to a more positive outlook on 
the Roadmap. 
Firstly, if the criticism is based on the contention that the EU is not able to raise the 
Strasbourg standard this creates false expectations. The aim of the Roadmap is not necessarily 
to raise this standard, but to adopt EU instruments with equal standards. And the result from 
the substantial analysis above has shown that for the first two measures this goal has been 
achieved. This brings us to the second point; even though at the moment it is very uncertain 
where Measure C will take us and the first signals do not meet the high ambitious set out by 
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the Roadmap itself, but at the same time the first two instruments that have been adopted 
show a much more positive outcome and have managed to set a standard at least similar to 
Article 6 ECHR. In addition to this; these instruments have the potential to even add to 
existing safeguards by clarifying some of the issues surrounding the right to interpretation and 
translation and the right to information and by incorporating some of the case law of the 
ECtHR in the text of the directives. 
Thirdly, and this is an aspect of the Roadmap which has been received positively by everyone, 
is its capacity to substantially increase safeguards in the context of EAW proceedings. As 
procedural safeguards are very scarce in the Framework Decision itself the inclusion of these 
proceedings in all the legislative instruments foreseen in the Roadmap is a big step forward 
and will lead to a better protection of rights of persons subjected to an EAW. 
In addition to the main substantial argument of this thesis, an effectiveness argument can be 
presented. One of the main problems with the ECHR system is the effectuation of Strasbourg 
rulings.422 The EU has got much stronger legislative tools and a more effective control 
mechanism than the Council of Europe. The Lisbon Treaty has enhanced the role of the ECJ 
in the AFSJ and has opened the road for minimum rules on individual rights. The enforcement 
mechanisms that come with these improvements have much greater potential than the ex post 
complaint procedure of the ECtHR. The ECJ has a general competence regarding questions of 
interpretation of the Treaty.423 National courts can request the ECJ for a preliminary ruling in 
criminal proceedings concerning procedural safeguards. Next to this the Commission has the 
power to bring a case against a Member State for failing to fulfil its obligations under the 
Treaty and can ultimately lead to financial penalties imposed by the ECJ (the so called 
‘infringement proceedings’). This strong enforcement mechanism in combination with the 
legal instrument used, directives rather than framework decisions (thus may have direct 
effect), open up the possibility of preliminary rulings and infringement proceedings.   
A potential threat for the Roadmap lies in the step-by-step approach as most of the rights 
proposed are complementary to each other and the full effects might only by visible when all 
of the Roadmap is adopted and in force.424 At the same time it will be easier to reach political 
agreement on one topic at a time than to present the full range at once; as was done in 2004 
with the proposal for a framework decision. Another potential threat is the implementation by 
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Member States; we have seen with the implementation of the EAW that some Member States 
have interpreted the text of the instrument rather loosely. An advantage here though is that the 
measures are not contained in framework decision, but in directives. 
Overall it can be concluded that even though it is still uncertain how the EU will further 
develop its programme on procedural rights, the progress made on Measures A and B has 
given us reason to believe that the EU is willing to adopt instruments that actually set a high 
standard of protection for suspects and defendants throughout the EU. The two measures 
adopted show that this means a standard mostly equal to the ECHR and in some respects an 
even more complete protection is offered. At this point the question can be asked whether 
such a high standard will also be achieved by Measure C, based on the Council general 
approach we have to answer this question with a swift ‘no’. But, more positively, it is 
necessary to stress that the negotiations are currently in a critical phase and the European 
Parliament will opt for a text closer to the initial Commission Proposal. The position of the 
Parliament will be to thoroughly scrutinize the Council general approach by holding a strong 
position in securing human rights at EU level. 
In defending the importance and potential of the Roadmap we could even go one step further 
and point to the wider potential of the Roadmap as it serves only as a ‘starting point’.425 We 
might in the future see a full and complete catalogue of criminal procedural safeguards unfold 
at EU level. An advantage the EU has in this respect is that within the Council of Europe 
standards set have to be acceptable for all its members (from Russia and Turkey to the UK 
and Germany), which can be very diverse in nature, EU cooperation is at a more advanced 
level. But for the near future our hopes will be on the adoption of the measures as set out by 





                                                          




Chapter 6. Analysing the EU policy on criminal procedural rights from a governance 
perspective 
6.1. Introduction 
Next to the substantial perspective- does the Roadmap add value to existing standards and 
what is the legal need for the Roadmap- there is a second way to analyse the Roadmap, 
namely how does this approximation of procedural laws influence the application of the 
principle of mutual recognition in the AFSJ? Before this chapter further examines this 
question, a brief evaluation of the background of mutual recognition in this context is given. 
6.2. Mutual recognition- ‘the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in criminal matters’ 
The idea of applying the mutual recognition principle in the field of criminal law was put 
forward by the UK Government during its EU Presidency in 1998. The European Council at 
Cardiff urged ‘the need to enhance the ability of national legal systems to work closely 
together’ and requested the Council ‘to identify the scope for greater mutual recognition of 
decisions of each other’s courts’.426 The UK regarded mutual recognition the only realistic 
option, as they saw that the differences between Member States’ legal systems were 
significant and harmonisation of criminal law was difficult to negotiate, time consuming and 
unrealistic.427 
The application of the principle of mutual recognition in JHA cooperation was endorsed428 at 
the Tampere European Council of 1999,429 and according to the Council the principle‘should 
become the cornerstone of judicial cooperation’ in criminal matters.430 Following the 
Tampere Council the Commission released a Communication expressing their thoughts on the 
principle.431 The Commission articulated its view that the traditional cooperation in the field 
is slow, cumbersome and uncertain, and presented its own interpretation of mutual 
recognition in criminal justice matters: 
                                                          
426 Tampere Conclusions, supra note 39, para. 39. 
427 See document submitted by the UK delegation to the (then) K.4 Committee, Council doc. 7090/99, 29 March 
1999 Brussels, paras. 7 and 8. 
428 For a more detailed look at the negotiations that led to this adoption see H. Nilson, ‘Mutual Trust or 
Mistrust?’, in G. de Kerchove and A. Weyembergh (eds.), La Confiance Mutuelle Dans l’Espace Pénal 
Européen/Mutual Trust in the European Criminal Area (Brussels, 2005), 29-33. 
429 At the Tampere Council meeting a five year agenda was set up for EU JHA. 
430 See the Presidency Conclusions at the Tampere European Council, supra note 39. 
431 COM (2000) 495 final, 26 July 2000 Brussels. 
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‘Thus, borrowing from concepts that have worked very well in the creation of the 
Single Market, the idea was born that judicial cooperation might also benefit from the 
concept of mutual recognition which, simply stated, means that once a certain 
measure, such as a decision taken by a judge in exercising his or her official powers in 
one Member State, has been taken, that measure- in so far as it has extra national 
implications- would automatically be accepted in all other Member States, and have 
the same or at least similar effects there.’432 
It does seem that the institutions involved supported the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition in the criminal justice area as an alternative to harmonisation. Mutual recognition 
can be interesting for those opposing harmonisation, as it can increase efficiency in cross-
border cooperation without requiring Member States to harmonise their national legal 
systems. At the same time it can satisfy those supporting further integration as it evades slow 
and cumbersome legislation procedures, and ultimately, can the successful application of 
mutual recognition lead to minimum harmonisation (a ‘spill-over’ effect). 
The first instrument adopted in the AFSJ following the principle was the Framework Decision 
on the EAW.433 Even though the Commission has hailed the EAW ‘a success’,434 
constitutional concerns have remained since its adoption.435  
The application of mutual recognition in the criminal law context will not lead to a ‘European 
criminal law’ comparable to what currently exists at national level. The pieces of legislation 
we see introduced now and the case law that eventually will develop will ultimately lead to a 
                                                          
432 Ibid, p. 2. 
433 A large body of literature has since formed on the EAW, see, for instance, Alegre and Leaf, supra note 120; 
R. Blextoon and W. van Ballegooij (eds.), Handbook on the European Arrest Warrant (The Hague, 2005); M. 
Plachta, ‘European Arrest Warrant: Revolution in Extradition?’, 11 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and 
Criminal Justice (2003), 178-194. 
434 Report from the Commission on the implementation of the EAW, COM (2007) 407 final, 11 July 2007 
Brussels. 
435 See Z. Deen-Racsmány, ‘The European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender of Nationals Revisited: The Lessons 
of Constitutional Challenges’, 14 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice (2006), 271-305; 
M. Fichera, ‘The European Arrest Warrant and the Sovereign State: A Marriage of Convenience?’, 15 European 
Law Journal (2009), 70-97; E. Guild and L. Marin (eds.), Still Not Resolved: Constitutional Issues of the European 
Arrest Warrant (Nijmegen, 2009); see also ECJ 3 May 2007, Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld v. Leden 
van de Ministerraad (2007), ECR I-3633; and F. Geyer, ‘Case Note: Advocaten voor de Wereld’, 4 European 
Constitutional Law Review (2008), 149-61. 
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‘coordinated’ system of diverse national criminal systems, as the monopoly of force remains 
with the Member States.436 
6.3. Objections to mutual recognition in the criminal justice sphere 
The principle of mutual recognition is ‘borrowed’ from the Community pillar and originates 
in a completely different context. It was first applied by the ECJ in relation to freedom of 
goods (product requirements),437 and gradually expanded to cover other Community policy 
areas.438 The objections articulated against the transfer of the principle from the internal 
market to the AFSJ are inherent to the fundamental differences between the two policy 
areas.439 The most fundamental concern (the qualitative argument) is that criminal justice is 
an area that substantially differs from the regulation of markets. Criminal law concerns the 
protection and limitation of individual rights and amendments to such fundamental rules 
should be properly debated and democratically legitimized. A second concern (the quantative 
argument) regards the mode and effect of recognition. Where mutual recognition in the 
internal market results in the free movement of (amongst others) products and thus leads to a 
greater application of fundamental EU principles, it could in the criminal law sphere 
ultimately result in the limitation of fundamental rights as further disadventageous or even 
coercive measures are required in order to execute a judicial decision (such as arrest, 
surrender and detention).440 Mitsilegas calls the recognition of national standards by other EU 
Member States a ‘journey into the unknown’,441 because an individual national standard must 
be recognised by other Member States- not an EU-wide negotiated standard. It is exactly this 
leap of faith that Member States have agreed upon when putting forward the principle of 
mutual recognition as the leading principle in criminal justice cooperation that now leads to 
difficulties as Member States are not as willing as initially thought to make this ‘journey’. 
                                                          
436 For a discussion of this ‘coordination of national systems’ see M. Fletcher, R. Loof and B. Gilmore, EU 
Criminal Law and Justice (Cheltenham, 2008), 108. 
437 ECJ 20 February 1979, Case-120/78, Commission Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Bundesverwaltung fur Branntwein 
(Cassis de Dijon) (1979), ECR 649. 
438 For more on mutual recognition in the internal market see, for instance, K. Armstrong, ‘Mutual Recognition’, 
in C. Barnard and J. Scott, The Law of the Single European Market: Unpacking the Premises (Oxford, 2002), 225-
267.   
439 Mostl however notes that one has to be careful in drawing analogies between the internal market and the 
AFSJ because of these fundamental differences; the assessment of the application of the principle can only be 
made on the basis of a clear distinction. See M. Mostl, ‘Preconditions and Limits of Mutual Recognition’ 47(2) 
Common Market Law Review (2010), 405-436, at 409. 
440 The two ‘arguments’ as formulated by Mitsilegas, supra note 117, 116-120; See also S. Lavenex, ‘Mutual 
Recognition and the Monopoly of Force: Limits of the Single Market Analogy’, 14 Journal of European Public 
Policy (2007), 762-779. 
441 Ibid, 119. 
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This brings us to the third challenge to a the successful application of mutual recognition in 
the criminal justice area, namely the matter of mutual trust. Trust is a necessetity in a system 
in which Member States are required to recognise standards that originate in the legal systems 
of other EU Member States. It is widely recognised that there currently is a lack of trust 
among Member States in each other’s criminal justice systems and it will be difficult for the 
principle of mutual recognition to operate without a certain level of trust.442 This lack of trust 
was already acknowledged at an early stage by the Commission when the Green Paper on an 
EU instrument on procedural safeguards was issued.443 Underlying the main reasons for such 
an instrument of offering suspects and defendants a decent standard of procedural fairness, 
was the contention that something had to be done to accommodate the lack of trust and a 
common instrument on procedural standards would be the solution. Unfortunately Member 
States could not agree on such an instrument and in the meantime continued with the adoption 
of measures based on mutual recognition; thus sooner or later the lingering problem of this 
lack of trust would return. 
The EU has since been trying to deal with this lack of trust in two ways: by the introduction of  
procedural rules (such as grounds for refusal) and referals to human rights in the mutual 
recognition instruments; and by the adoption (or attempts to) of specific trust-building 
measures. The first way; the introduction of procedural rules, has only led to very few 
safeguards in the actual mutual recognition led instruments and a list of preambular referals of 
which the legal value is unsure. For examples of the second way; the adoption of trust-
building measures, one has to think of measures such as evaluation mechanisms, training 
programs and enhancing the role of the ECJ. It is the perspective of these ‘trust-buiding’ 
measures that will be taken upon the Roadmap here. 
6.4. Can the Roadmap increase trust among Member States? 
What exactly is the Roadmap required to achieve as a ‘trust-building’ measure? If mutual 
recognition is the key principle for the development of the AFSJ, why are we even looking at 
approximation here? Mutual recognition differs from harmonisation; whereas in the former 
differences are kept in a system of cooperation and trust, in the latter differences are being 
eliminated in order to create a single homogeneous system. Harmonisation creates a common 
                                                          
442 See Vernimmen-Van Tiggelen et al., supra note 78, especially Section V. 
443 See chapter 3.1. 
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normative standard and mutual recognition accepts that many normative standards co-exist.444 
In order to fully understand harmonisation it is important to distinguish between the different 
degrees, from the lowest, approximation, to the highest, unification. Unification aims at 
eliminating all disparities between judicial systems by introducing a ‘uniform’ set of rules 
which broadly apply; it would therefore lead to a completely uniform system. It is widely 
acknowledged that such unification of criminal law in the EU context is not a very realistic 
target as Member States regard their national criminal justice systems as the core of the state 
and reflect on a national tradition and culture. Therefore the Lisbon Treaty allows for 
approximation of procedural laws, thus the lowest form of harmonisation, and aims at 
eliminating the most relevant disparities between Member States. Approximation does not 
lead to a full harmonization of national systems, but only creates a common minimum 
standard, so Member States can rely on this ‘minimum’ standard to be existent in all 
jurisdictions. It is therefore not a question of harmonisation or mutual recognition, but 
approximation (the ‘lowest’ form of harmonisation) in order to make mutual recognition 
successfuly operate in the criminal law sphere. 
To answer the question whether the approximating instruments set out by Roadmap can 
increase trust (and thus enhance mutual recognition) among Member States requires an 
instrumental viewpoint. Instrumental in the sense that what is being examined here is whether 
the measures adopted in accordance with the Roadmap can lead to improving trust among 
Member States and therefore improve the application of mutual recogntion. The Roadmap 
will thus be judged on how it contributes to the development of a governance principle. This 
could be seen as a rather ‘sceptical’ approach towards the EU policy on procedural safeguards 
as it views the Roadmap as if only issued to make the ‘overarching aim’ of mutual recognition 
work. But even if (one of the) purpose(s) of the Roadmap is to enhance trust and thus mutual 
recognition, rights protection would at the same time still increase and therefore the AFSJ 
would become a more ‘just’ place; as has been pointed out by the previous chapter on the 
substance of the Roadmap.     
Because a degree of minimum trust is necessary in order for mutual recognition to function 
effectively, mutual trust could be described as ‘the principle behind the principle’. The ECJ 
has assumed in its case law on ne bis in idem that a high level of trust between Member States 
                                                          
444 For more on this see, for instance, I. Bantekas, ‘The Principle of Mutual Recognition in EU Criminal Law’, 
32(3) European Law Review (2007), 365-385. 
83 
 
exists.445 According to the ECJ mutual trust necessarily underpins Article 54 Schengen 
Implementing Agreement on the principle of ne bis in idem, which requires Member States to 
recognise foreign judicial decisions. The Court does not accept the diversity that exists 
between the various legal systems as a ground for non-execution of the principle.446 This 
pragmatic approach by the Court is understandable as any other decision would have left the 
fundamental ne bis in idem principle without effect. But however much this ‘legal fiction’ in 
the context of ne bis in idem cases is necessary, practice shows a different less prospering 
image of mutual trust. 
Criminal law is the field par excellence447 in which states have the belief that their own 
national laws and procedures are superior to those of other countries. States easily point to the 
flaws and shortcomings in foreign procedures and at the same time defend their own system. 
Interestingly enough there is not a single signatory to the ECHR whose criminal justice 
system has not been found in violation of Article 6 ECHR by the Strasbourg Court. Thus an 
essential first step towards improvement would be for Member States to at least recognise that 
other criminal justice systems in the EU can be equal even though different. But recent 
developments such as for instance the cumbersome and difficult implementation of the 
EAW448 have shown that trust is lacking and mutual recognition requires some form of 
approximation of criminal procedural law across the EU in order to work.449 
The Roadmap as a ‘trust-building’ measure aims at increasing mutual trust by setting an EU 
wide standard for procedural safeguards.450 Whether it will ultimately increase trust remains 
ucertain at the moment as the first measure still has to enter into force and the manner of 
                                                          
445 See ECJ 11 February 2003, Joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01, Gozutok and Brugge, ECR I-1345; see also 
M. Fletcher, ‘Some Developments to the ne bis in idem Principle in the European Union: Criminal Proceedings 
Against Huseyn Gozutok and Klaus Brugge’, 66(5) Modern Law Review (2003), 769-780; K. Ligeti, ‘Rules on the 
Application of ne bis in idem in the EU’, 1(2) EUCrim (2009), 37-42; M. Wasmeier, ‘The Development of ne bis in 
idem into a Transnational Fundamental Right in EU Law: Comments on Recent Developments’, 31 European 
Law Review (2006), 565-578. 
446 ECJ 28 September 2006, Case C-467/04, Gasparini, ECR I-9199; see also B. Van Bockel, The Ne Bis in Idem 
Principle in EU Law (The Hague, 2010). 
447 Brants, supra note 101, 103.  
448 For instance the failure to bring the EAW into force and the inclusion of extensive grounds of refusal by 
some Member States can be mentioned. See Commission Report, supra note 434. See also M. Fichera, The 
Implementation of the European Arrest Warrant in the European Union: Law, Policy and Practice (Antwerp, 
2011); N. Keijzer and E. van Sliedregt (eds.), The European Arrest Warrant in Practice (The Hague, 2009). 
449 Harmonisation of substantial criminal law has already taken place and has led to secondary legislation on for 
instance money laundering, terrorism and cybercrime; for an overview of these measures see D. Chalmers, G. 
Davies and G. Monti, European Union Law: Cases and Materials (Cambridge, 2010), 611-618. 
450 As envisaged by the Stockholm Programme, supra note 44, point 2.4; and in the Roadmap itself, supra note 
140, recitals 6-8. 
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implementation will be very important. Even though these reflections have a provisional 
character, it is still possible to voice high expectations regarding the effect of the Roadmap on 
trust within the EU. This especially in conjunction with the conclusions drawn earlier on the 
legal value of the Roadmap, because even though these two perspectives have been treated 
seperately here, they are very much intertwined. The matter of trust (or the lack thereof) 
mainly originates in concerns in ‘foreign’ criminal procedures, and a common EU standard 
could help assure that if persons are being sent to other Member States they at least have the 
assurance of a proper and fair treatment. Theoretically this should already be the case under 
the ECHR, but the poor record of many of the Member States required EU involvement in 
procedural safeguards. Even though the Roadmap may not directly result in an unconditional 
trust, it could be a positive step and lead to further development of the EU programme on 
criminal procedure. ‘Mutual trust is more likely to occur if legal systems are comparable to or 
at least easily understood by others’,451 and this is something the Roadmap can help achieve. 
In the end; if Member States have to fully scrutinize the safeguards guaranteed in another 
jurisdiction each time they submit or receive a request, they will no longer be able to 
cooperate with each other in a useful and efficient manner, as aimed at by a system of 
cooperation based on mutual recognition. As concluded in the previous chapter, the first two 
Roadmap measures adopted have set a serious standard of legal protection for suspects in 
criminal cases and when implemented in all national jurisdictions throughout the EU this 
means that Member States can have full faith in respect for these rights across the EU. More 
specifically this means that after Measure A and B have entered into force suspects and 
defendants throughout the EU will be assured a right to translation and interpretation together 
with the issuance of a letter of rights which informs them of their other rights under the law of 
that ‘foreign’ jurisdiction and a right to access to the case file. The further development of the 
Roadmap is ongoing and if all the rights as set out by the Roadmap have entered into force 
this creates a broad and useful catalogue of rights at EU level and assures suspects and 
defendants throughout the EU a more just process. Of course the previous chapter has also 
shown that there are currently some difficulties in the negotiating phase and especially the 
removal of the right to legal aid from Measure C is worrying. However, the first Directive 
enters into force soon and it is possible that it is only then that by positive experience Member 
States realise the EU has got great potential in this field and that mutual recognition operates 
                                                          
451 C. Rijken, ‘Re-Balancing Security and Justice: Protection of Fundamental Rights in Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters’, 47 Common Market Law Review (2010), 1455-1492, at 1473. 
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better with a common minimum standard in place; thus Member States might be more 
inclined to successfully execute the plan set out by the Roadmap.   
Trust has proven not to be blind, but conditional upon the respect of rules (the respect for 
procedural rules by other Member States),452 and without a formal mechanism for monitoring 
‘criminal procedures’ this evaluation by Member States is fairly subjective.453 This brings us 
to the connection made previously between a high standard of protection together with the EU 
potential in enforcement. Transpancy and enforcement are key factors in this evaluation and 
can create good faith between Member States by not only making rights more visible at EU 
level but also by subjecting them to the strong EU enforcement tools and supervision by the 
ECJ. 
It should be noted that guaranteeing an acceptable level of safeguards for suspects and 
defendants throughout the EU by approximation of national legislation is not the only possible 
measure to strengthen trust within the EU criminal justice space. A whole range of (non-) 
legal measures has been set out by the Stockholm Programme to improve trust and to make 
mutual recognition work.454 Nevertheless a strong EU involvement in procedural safeguards 
can prove to be the ideal solution and has the potential of enhancing judicial cooperation by 
strenghtening mutual trust as well as providing suspects and defendants with an adequate 
level of procedural protection. Requests for recognition of a judicial decision would be 
executed more easily if the competent authorities within Member States would be assured that 
the requesting authorities are bound by the same procedural rules. The same procedural 
standards will lead to trust, and with trust being a prerequisite to the principle of mutual 
recognition, the Roadmap has the key to make mutual recognition flourish in the context of 
criminal justice cooperation. By starting with the ambitious project of the Roadmap the EU 
has acknowledged that a degree of procedural approximation is necessary to make the main 
mode of governance, mutual recognition, work. Now the first steps have been set to a serious 
imlementation of the Roadmap programme this should show signs of an increase in trust 
between Member States as soon as the directives enter into force. 
 
                                                          
452 M. Fichera, ‘Mutual Trust in European Criminal Law’, University of Edinburgh School of Law, Working Paper 
Series (2009/2010), 13. 
453 A mechanism of monitoring procedural safeguards is clearly lacking from the Roadmap, it can only be hoped 
that such mechanism at EU level will ultimately be developed. 
454 For instance evaluation, training and implementation are goals as set out by the Stockholm Programme, 
supra note 44, point 3.2. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
The developments in the field of EU criminal law in the past decade have undeniably led to a 
crime-control bias and have mainly been prosecution-oriented. This can be illustrated by the 
contrast between the prosperous and quick adoption of the EAW, and the failure to adopt the 
FDPR on which negotations lasted over four years. This enforcement bias together with the 
fact that the level of human rights protection in criminal proceedings is not always sufficient 
across the EU, demonstrated by the difficulties the ECtHR is facing in enforcing its case law 
(many Member States show a poor compliance record with Article 6 ECHR), and by the 
failure of the Court to answer the large amount of cases brought to Strasbourg, shows a clear 
need for action at EU level. It is only recently that some progress was made in the 
development of procedural rights by the adoption of the Roadmap on procedural rights which 
identifies areas for legislative initiatives and provides for a step-by-step approach, bearing in 
mind the complexity of the issues. Since the adoption of the Roamap we have seen two 
measures adopted and a major stumbling block lies ahead with the negotiations for the 
directives on the sensitive topics of acces to a lawyer and legal aid.  
The benefits and value of the Roadmap identified in this thesis mainly exist in the high 
standard of protection aimed at by the Roadmap, strengthened by the new enforcement 
opportunites created by the Lisbon Treaty. Also should be mentioned that the application of 
the ‘co-decision’ procedure to the area of criminal cooperation has made it easier to adopt 
instruments on criminal (procedural) matters, and the use of directives rather than framework 
decisions will lead to a direct obligation for Member States to comply with its content. The 
(upcoming) judicial control of the ECJ and the ability for the Commission to assure 
compliance with directives in the field- with the strong enforcement tool of the ‘infringement 
proceedings’, are the achievements that will ensurance compliance with the norms set out in 
the EU instruments on procedural safeguards. Another aspect in which the Roadmap can 
prove beneficial is its application in EAW proceedings; a field in which little protection for 
those subjected to a warrant currently exists. All these elements together make the Roadmap a 
project with great potential that has to be taken seriously.  
This thesis has shown that the most often heard critique on the Roadmap; its incapability of 
meeting the ECHR standard, can swiftly be dealt with by demonstrating that the standard of 
protection in the first two measures is at least similar to the standard in Article 6 ECHR. This 
is not to say that the two measures adopted have a scope equal to Article 6, it has been shown 
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that the ECHR offers a much broader and more complete protection than what the Roadmap 
has to offer yet. However, what has been argued here is that at least based on the first two 
measures the Roadmap is introducing a series of useful instruments that make the specific 
rights prioritised more visible and enforcable. What this thesis thus provides is very much a 
provisional judgement of the Roadmap, as well as a prospect on the future potential of it. 
The specific analysis of the first two measures already adopted has shown that Member States 
are willing to set a high standard, both practically and legally. Measure A on the right to 
translation and interpretation meets the standard set by the ECHR and adds to this by: 
explicitly mentioning the right to translation, which is not stated as such in the text of the 
Article 6; making use of the practical term ‘essential’ in relation to what documents have to 
be translated; forbidding waiver of the right to interpretation and clarifying the circumstances 
regarding waiver of the right to translation; and providing for a right to interpretation of 
communication with counsel. Measure B on the right to information generally meets the 
ECHR standard, except for the time limit set for authorities to provide the defence with 
documents; thus limit is rather inefficient and does not meet the Strasbourg standard. In 
addition: the right to information about rights, as guaranteed by the Directive, is not as such 
guaranteed by the ECHR; the ‘letter of rights’ is a ‘new’ safeguard; and the Directive codifies 
access to the case file. 
The negotiations on the following, politically more difficult, directive has shown a less 
encouraging image. The just decribed experience with the first two directives has provided us 
with a strong fundament for the expectation that an equal instrument can be the final result of 
these negotiations. At the same time one has to be realistic and acknowledge that the 
substance of the instruments under negotiation is of a different gravity than the first two, and 
has more farreaching implications; both financially and legally. However, it is to be expected 
that the minimalistic approach towards this instrument by the Council will be counter-
balanced by the European Parliament. The Parliament’s task is to ensure that the legislative 
process is conducted scrupulously and they will hold a firm position in upholding a worthy 
human rights standard that does not fall below what is guaranteed at EU level as well as 
internationally. What ultimately the outcome is going to be is unclear at the moment and all 
that can be done here is underlying its great potential and importance.  
The other way of analysing the Roadmap; its effect on mutual trust, can provide us with an 
insight into why Member States would make an effort to allow an EU instrument to make 
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substantial changes to their criminal justice systems. An incentive for Member States to fulfil 
the mandate of the Roadmap might be its ability to increase trust. The principle of mutual 
recognition in criminal matters was presented as the ‘cornerstone principle’ of criminal 
cooperation and was useful as it allowed for Member States to retain their national legal 
systems, but at the same time to cooperate in an efficient manner. A prerequisite to this 
principle, and maybe overlooked at the time of the Tampere meeting, was that mutual trust is 
essential for mutual recognition to work in the context of criminal law. And after the 
‘flagship’ instrument, the EAW, applying mutual recogntion was adopted and entered into 
force, only then it was shown by practice that trust was lacking among Member States. One of 
the reasons to transfer mutual recognition from the internal market sphere to cooperation in 
criminal matters was to prevent the cumbersome and slow harmonisation of legal systems; 
ironically recent practice has shown that it is only through approximation that mutual 
recognition can flourish. This realisation has reached the Member States and it will 
undoubtedly play an important part in the decision each Member State has to make on 
whether to support a directive with a strong scope and content that will lead to rights that are 
practical and effective, or whether it will come up with an instrument that all procedures can 
achieve without making amendments and thus in effect would be ‘useless’. It can therefore 
only have a stimulating effect on negotiations that mutual recognition was at its adoption 
presented as if the Council had reinvented the wheel, and in the past decade huge efforts have 
been made to successfully implement the principle of mutual recognition in the AFSJ. The 
whole project of mutual reccognition is simply too costly and important to fail. It would not 
be right to say that the ‘project’ of the AFSJ in its entirety and mutual recognition would be 
immediately jeopardised if the measures contained in the Roadmap will not all get adopted, 
but in time it can prove to be an essential factor in the success or failure of mutual recognition 
as the further development of the ‘recognition’ led measures is ongoing.    
It is thus too early to question the value of the Roadmap, as it does have great potential mainly 
demonstrated by the high standard achieved in the first two instruments and the effective EU 
control mechanism that would apply to the safeguards set out in the Roadmap. The 
negotiations on these measures create a feeling of deja-vu as we have seen similar difficulties 
during the negotiations for a FDPR. The big difference and advantage of the current 
programme is that the debate on competence is no longer relevant and the Roadmap provides 
for a step-by-step approach and thus presents small pieces of legislation at a time; which will 
be easier to digest for Member States. At the same time this approach presents a disadvantage 
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as well because these procedural rights are complementary to each other and in order to be 
practical and effective all aspects have to be in balance. Thus again should be stressed that the 
negotiations are currently in a ‘crucial’ stage; the legislative framework and enforcement tools 
are provided for, it is now up to the Member States to show real political determination to 
finally provide suspects and defendants in the EU with a worthy set of safeguards. To come 
back to the question raised at the beginning; whether the Roadmap is actually leading towards 
an EU criminal justice system with rights at the heart of it, this thesis has shown that the 
Roadmap has the potential to lay the fundaments of such a system and that the ambitious 
project set out by the Roadmap is one which can finally show that the AFSJ not only exists in 
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